Showing posts with label criticism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label criticism. Show all posts

Sunday, September 5, 2010

Peter Craven: Why I Can't Write

- with apologies to G. Orwell

A bit of a follow-up to the Peter Craven edition of Pseuds Corner a while back. A few things have been pointed out to me by the Stage's 5.5 readers that bear on the Craven case and I think are worth repeating.

The argument from one quarter was that the Special Edition neglected to give the impression that Mr C can at times write better prose than what was on display in the 7 extracts I picked on a few weeks ago. This recent op-ed piece was cited as an example:

"Would that politics in this country were as well run as the ABC's political panel show Q and A - on a good day. Television transforms our apprehension of politics by its vividness, its accuracy and the sense of occasion with which it presents it. - Q and A began only last year, but is already essential to the political landscape. It presents a panel that includes a member each from the government and the opposition, a couple of journalists or intellectuals, perhaps someone from business or a think tank - five in all plus the presenter (Lateline's Tony Jones) - and subjects them to live questions from the audience plus a sprinkling sent in electronically. The format works superbly, highlighting both the political skill of our politicians and the fact that there is a lot more to the governing of a country than mere party political differences." (Peter Craven, "Question: What makes tv great? Answer: Q and A" The Age)

There's no doubt it's better written, though I'd hardly say that makes exhibits (a) through (g) from the Special Edition any more excusable, either from the point of view of Craven as a writer or that of his editors.

The argument from another quarter, precisely along these lines, was that the case against Craven's writing made in the Special Edition actually didn't go far enough. James of Coburg made the point that if he had submitted a single line of the prose from exhibits (a) through (g) to the editors of any of Australia's major literary publications then he would probably have been told straight-up that he was writing unpublishable drivel.

In the case of submissions (a) through to (g), professional editing would have meant refusing Mr Craven column space on the grounds of egregious lack of merit, coherence and substance, though some exceptions, James suggested, might be made for exhibits (c), (d) and (e), which, to quote James himself, "are more in the nature of a gossip column". (Decide for yourself whether the Lilian Frank persona Craven adopts for his Australian Spectator column is innocuous or intellectually offensive. I'm happy to concede James's point: lowering literary standards is fair enough if the only point of a piece really is to let Peter let the world know he saw Eddie and Carla Maguire at the latest Mary Poppins production.)

James's more important point though is that Mr Craven is being seriously indulged by many of the major editorial powers in the land, who, in publishing material of the - to use a Cravenism - loose baggy monstrousness of exhibits (a) through (g) are effectively refusing to edit. In this, I have to say, I agree. Like James, I find it hard to believe that a sane editor who'd been set the task of exercising his/her professional skills on exhibits (a) through (g) - from behind a veil of anonymity for instance - would have failed to apply the red pencil to every sentence even vaguely like this one:

"The easiest way into Rothwell is via Another Country, because that book makes clear without any overwhelming baroque turbulence that we are dealing with a cultivated sensibility, all but flypapered with the culture of Europe, the kind of bloke who jumped on a plane to see, as soon as possible, a newly rediscovered Titian in eastern Europe, who is steeped in the literary power of the 19th-century Australian explorers and is alive not only to his own desire for illumination and the potential for personal enlightenment and spiritual excruciation that comes from exploration (in all its literal and metaphorical ambivalence); but who is also, in a worldly sense, open to the fact that "spiritual tourism", like the taste for Aboriginal art, is a growth industry and a collective sussurration of which his own whispering is a part." ("Appointment with the sublime", ALR)

I also agree with James that there are aspects of grotesque awfulness to Mr Craven's prose - and his general mindset - that I actually left out of my initial collection. The list of excesses and foibles I started the Craven edition of Pseuds Corner with wasn't meant to be exhaustive and I now think I could've come up with a better list. At the top of it would have to go Craven's love of superfine comparisons between the works - or even the whole literary oeuvres - of his favourite literary geniuses - sometimes 4 or 5 per paragraph. To quote the above splurge about Nicholas Rothwell again:

"Of course, putting it like this is unfair to Rothwell, whose work is as moving and eloquent and imaginative (and as willing to stare down the truth no matter what mesmerising abyss it lurks in) as contemporary writing can be. But he is at the same time at an edge of artifice and distinctiveness where a lot of wise heads and smart money are liable to reject him. What was it that Dr Johnson said of Milton? That, as Ben Jonson had earlier said of Spenser, he writ no language, that he wrote a Babylonish dialect? And wasn't it Joseph Conrad, himself a latter-day Homer of the sea, who said of that most Miltonic of prose epics, Moby Dick, that it didn't have a single line of sincerity in it? - This is the hyperbole of the anti-hyperbolic. . . Rothwell is a remarkable writer and he has the exorbitant pretentiousness that goes with everything that is exquisite and mandarin and expectant about his whole endeavour. - Whether he's waiting for God or Godot in the desert doesn't matter, or only to him. His Northern Territory is a kind of junkyard of the detritus of a formidable if decadent European cultivation, but who could object, that's how Dostoyevsky saw the West and its gaming tables: with cold, engrossed eyes."
 
"In one way it's a form of landscape novel writing in which the world of characters in an ongoing drama is replaced by the brooding consciousness of the narrator who, by necessity, arrogates to himself whatever more or less Wordsworthian fascinations interiority and its thousand minute modulations might disclose. - V.S. Naipaul's The Enigma of Arrival is one kind of locus classicus of this kind of writing, the fiction of Gerald Murnane is another. It is, in any case, a form of documentary fiction-making that realigns fiction (or non-fiction, because it confounds the distinction) with the long backward arch of Romantic poetry. You can no more argue with Sebald's The Rings of Saturn than you can with Wordsworth's Prelude or - if you want to change the game a little - with T.S. Eliot's Four Quartets  and Rilke's Duino Elegies."  (Peter Craven, "Appointment with the sublime", Australian Literary Review, The Australian)

Prima facie, what we have here is a species of literary name-dropping, which was something I did suggest Craven did a lot of, along with (a) invoking High Art as a quasi-metaphysical value, (b) theatrically purporting to explain himself without explaining anything, (c) coining bizarre metaphors (d) badly imitating the earthy side of Robert Hughes and (e) referring to God for rhetorical effect. In a more rigorous survey of Mr Craven's prose-style though, the superfine comparisons and general analogy-mongering, I can see now, would belong in a different category to the vulgar "met Charlotte and Cate for lunch"-style shop-talk.

The reason why material like the ghastly Rothwell review belongs in a category of its own will be obvious to anyone who's ever opened the arts pages of an Australian newspaper looking for a critical interpretation whose basic line of thought he can follow: all the huff and puff about great writers in Craven's reviews endlessly defers the point where he has to justify his responses, as opposed to giving his readers unargued demonstrations of his own overwhelming knowledgeability. Yes, the tone is so snobbish it's ridiculous, based as it is on the premiss that normal readers of the The Australian could mentally reference the nuances contained in a library-worth of books with the ease that Craven appears to be able to do so. But much more important than that is the fact that writing like Craven's bears very little thinking about. Read it and imagine yourself putting the question to Mr C "How would you actually flesh out that grand-sounding analogy between St Paul and Montaigne, Nicholas Rothwell and Milton, Mahler and Cormac McCarthy, Kodi Smit-Macphee and the patriarch Abraham etc etc etc?" What could Craven possibly say? All I can imagine is a sort of authoritative pre-discursive groan, signifying something like "CAN'T YOU SEE I'M VERY CULTURED! (Get you gone.)"

However, bad writing created by a desire to seem massively well-read is maybe only part of Craven's problem. The other half of the problem is the result of a bad mental habit and here again more needs to be said about how Craven gets himself into it. My sense is this. For Craven, the basic game of reviewing is to indicate in a roundabout way what the aesthetic experience of a book or a film reminds him of, which turns out to be another aesthetic experience. The reviews then spend much of their time joining the dots between these singular points of personal aesthetic experience without communicating the least part of the content of that experience to the reader.

Another grave problem for Craven that I didn't mention in the Pseuds Special Edition are all those sentences choking on linguistic fetish-items: the "rich and strange" stock-phrases that read like the first things that enter Mr C's mind rather than fully-formed subject-plus-predicate-style thoughts about the matter at hand. When Craven is at his worst, the bold metaphors simply get thrown together to create a sort of chaotic high-toned poetry:

"In that respect, as in others, McCarthy is the heir of Hemingway, with a thundering command of action that enthrals, though his cadences are stately and artful and the feeling that runs through his books encompasses the pity and the terror and the tears in things. You begin reading All the Pretty Horses, which opens his Border Trilogy, thinking that you are experiencing the Platonic idea of escapist writing because you are enjoying a cowboy book for the first time since you were ten only to discover that this is no reanimation of the delights of childhood. It is a [sic] Kindertotenlieder. . .

From the outset, the film [of McCarthy's The Road] skilfully establishes the moral gravity that underlines the horror-style narrative momentum. The father's narration tells us that if God's voice does not come through the child, then he never spoke a word. And so it goes as father and son move over the bleached and devastated landscapes of some rural Pennsylvania or Oregon of the mind, some Montana that may be coterminous with a world where men rove like wolves."("Baby Dante and Apocalypse" ABR) [my italics. Ed]

What is basically at issue in McCarthy as a novellist and in the film versions of The Road in particular? What are the basic themes here? Isn't that the simplest question that the reader of a review might expect to get an answer to? Can Mr C answer it? Well, he can run through the plot of The Road, throwing in semantically unmotivated references to Platonic ideas, "literary high-jinks", the "tears of being", a "Montana of the mind", seeing various things through a glass darkly, "all that is red and tooth in claw" - oh and "the ineffable" (which he proceeds to say an eff'ing lot about).

But how does McCarthy's novel actually work? How does McCarthy's literary apocalyptic or Hillcoat's film version of it relate to the reality of our present world or that of the future? Admittedly these aren't the most sophisticated literary critical questions. But if as a reviewer you can't even give a vague sense of an answer, your review just doesn't belong on the arts pages of a broadsheet newspaper. The trouble with Mr C as a reviewer is that he rarely answers any of these sorts of entry-level questions about structure or significance and the constipated prose-style is part of the reason why: Craven habitually spends so much of his time in most of his reviews chewing and re-chewing the same pet phrases that he fails to give a critical impression of a book or get across a coherent line of thought about it.

If we were just talking about a literary tic that we had to ignore in order to get to the analysis, interpretation and evaluation that form the essence of any really substantial criticism then maybe it'd all be worth it. But in Craven's case, the reviews seem to be all tic and no text. On a good day, Craven can indicate, in a roundabout way (roughly as he does in his response to Q and A) whether he thinks something is good or bad, pointless or worthy: the evaluative bit. But most of the time, he's so busy tweaking silly phrases that analysis, interpretation and evaluation are nowhere in sight.

*

Six months ago, Gideon Haigh sparked medium-level controversy in the literary world by suggesting that Australian criticism is nowadays light-on and uninspired. Book reviews in particular, according to Haigh, are increasingly being farmed out to general staff writers who, in the absence of special knowledge, drown the reader in vague impressions and almost never venture strong-minded critical opinions. Yet while it's true nowadays that Australian literary editors seem to have a preference for favourable reviews, especially of local fare, there's a double-edge to this particular sword and I'm guessing Haigh is aware of it. The trouble is that there's something far worse than reviewers giving everyone who managed to get into print an encouragement award. And that's reviewers giving what they don't like an unargued critical caning.

"Bestial metaphor abounds in Shakespeare's tale of sexual jealousy. Director Peter King takes his cue from it, entering the jungle of physical theatre to deliver a production canopied by a writhing tableau of carnal play. . . [Annie] Last's Desdemona carved out an unlikely wedge of dignity for herself. King's work, as he puts it, ''continues to disdain naturalism, whatever that may be''. - It's the kind of statement that makes naturalism seem like pornography: you can't describe it, but you know it when you see it. - In fact, Shakespeare is both naturalistic and not. To the extent that the burgeoning sensuality of King's conception accentuates the trauma at the heart of Othello, it's fair enough. - But this production seems more interested in playing with itself than to the audience, and some of its rude tricks seem to be compensating for a lack of technique." (Cameron Woodhead reviews "Othello" at fortyfivedownstairs, The Age)

Ignore the wretched word painting. (Anyone up for a ticket to a production "canopied by a writhing tableau of carnal play"?!) There's another thing that Craven and his protégés are very good at. And that is filling out reviews with casual put downs. Take the pointless sneer from Mr C himself at the end of this paragraph:

"With the passage of the years Waiting for Godot has come to seem less like a shocking paradigm of absurdity and more like the deep sad comedy of a continuing condition (call it human if you must). As with Eliot’s Waste Land, the brilliance of the comic surface has almost outlived the existential insecurity it is shaping. - Sean Mathias’s quietly brilliant production takes this fact as its opportunity by constantly emphasising the mature human face of the grinding rituals through which his two ageing tramps wait and wander (wittily and witlessly) as Godot puts them through their paces in his failure to come. McKellen and Rees, in contrasted ways, have the rueful stoicism of age, and their comic embrace of catastrophe — McKellen’s boggle-eyed and flailing, Rees’s dapper and wincing — is light years from the contorted angst of young actors with the world before them as an enigmatic agony." (Peter Craven reviews Sean Mathias' "Waiting for Godot", The Spectator)

Off we go again. The stars of Craven's literary canon twinkle brightly. In the foreground phrases get made, phrases get murdered, the storehouses of the English language are laid waste in the search for a maximally colourful figure of speech or an intermediate term in a world-historical literary analogy. The Craven caning that comes at the end of the paragraph is a model of how not to proceed as an intellectually responsible critic: spend most of your time cueing your readers as to how well-read you are, denigrate your critical object by rhetorically screwing up your face - never put it in a context in which its failings become comprehensible from a broader point of view.

The vague swipes are more than faintly insulting to artists and readers alike. And perhaps the only excuse Australian arts editors have for filling out review pages with tepid positivity is to avoid the negative consequences of badly-written reviews that attitudinise instead of arguing in just this style. Tepid critical praise for every work has one advantage over nasty pseudery. It avoids everyone involved in the arts, including your newspaper's dwindling readership, from feeling justifiably offended. 

*

Now, there are people in the Australian arts world who are willing to call Craven on his sloppy intellectual habits and the poor standard of his writing. From memory, Gideon Haigh didn't single out Mr C for special treatment at Readings six months ago. Alison Croggon by contrast has been consistently willing to do so, for instance in this hard-hitting reply to Craven.

For the sake of background, here's a moderately pseudish snippet from the comment-piece by Mr C that got on Croggon's nerves:

"Naturalism and disruptive high jinks: the theatre needs both. Yes, we need a writer's theatre that is also an actor's theatre, where the director serves the text and highlights — and disciplines — the strength of the actor. We need Rush and Steve Sewell and a director such as Kate Cherry, who can quietly find the music in a Hannie Rayson play. Maybe in the end we need it more than the declamatory atonal music of Andrews and Kosky. - Half the trouble with Australian theatre is caused by talented directors who feel they are above realism and well-made plays. Often they cut their teeth with student theatre and have been too narcissistic to grow up. It's much easier to treat student actors like puppets and to improvise a text than it is to treat Judy Davis like that. Most cut-and-paste postmodern tinkerings with classics make Joanna Murray-Smith look like Racine on a good day. But for every production such as Osage, there's hand-me-down cardboard rubbish of the traditional kind. - We want the best actors commanding the respect of directors who will allow the best of our playwrights to take their places alongside the Pirandellos and Greeks. A theatre which is ancient and modern, classic and cutting-edge, Australian and internationalist, with a deep instinctive sense that to make it new, you have to have a theatrical eye for the glitter of the old. Where is naturalism in all this? Well, we need a theatre that has emotional truth, and we need a theatre that understands the magic of its own artifice." ("The trouble with Australian theatre", The National Times)

As ever, the main argument gets lost in the muddy swirl of tenuous comparisons. It shouldn't take a paragraph with fifteen proper names to tell us that in Mr C's opinion Australian theatre needs to strike a balance between naturalism and experimental disruption. However, without a definition of his main terms (naturalism//"disruptive high jinks", mainstream vs experimental theatre, emotional truth vs deconstruction of traditions), even that relatively simple point evaporates into thin air. The run-through of recent productions by major Australian theatre companies in the rest of the piece contains plenty of examples that seem to fall on both sides of the apparent divide between naturalism and "disruptive high jinks", so you fast end up wondering what the complaint that there's too much "disruption" really amounts to.

Croggon's point is essentially the one about definitions and it's very well taken: surely no one who had thought a little about the term "mainstream theatre" would be silly enough to claim that most mainstream products are particularly "naturalistic", or that the popularity of mainstream shows follows from any notable adherence to "naturalism". In short, Craven - to the extent that he is arguing anything at all - is re-hashing an age-old debate between naturalism and its opponents - a debate which any sophisticated critic ought to know is completely unresolvable when framed in these simplistic terms. For anyone who didn't do Aesthetics 101, let it be said that in the Nineteenth Century, the advocates of aesthetic naturalism extolled naturalism as an escape from arbitrary stylisation, while the advocates of aesthetic anti-naturalism condemned it as a step backwards from the reality-sublimating and reality-subverting functions of art itself. Anyone with a rough grasp of the history of criticism can see that insisting on a "theatre of emotional truth", as Craven does, loads the dice against art which doesn't take truth or emotion as the measure of aesthetic significance. More than that, arguing for naturalism in this simple-minded way overlooks the relatively obvious point that naturalism is itself a form of artifice - one which in some circumstances becomes less than fully aware of itself and under the conditions of mass cultural spectacle often leads to nothing but the repetition of emotional cliche's and psychological stereotypes.

In any case, the sort of ideal Australian theatre that Craven manages to build out of his insistence on "emotional truth" is so vague as to be largely meaningless. A theatre with a "deep instinctive sense that to make it new you have to keep an eye on the glitter of the old"? A theatre that "understands the magic of its own artifice"? What on earth would that amount to specifically? I suppose here at least we can be glad that Craven's pseudo-ideal is captured in a sentence with a beginning that relates to its middle and end according to a principle other than literary free association. Still if the actual content of the ideal would make a meaningful difference to theatre programming or theatrical practice, then Craven leaves us clueless how.

If I had to guess what Mr C is trying to say at this point - it's that he wants to be emotionally moved when he goes to the theatre - that Great Art is deeply moving and so could be truly popular if it weren't being screwed up by "narcissistic" avant-gardists. Let's take it that that's what Craven would be saying if he weren't beating about the bush. Let's also take it that Mr C's desire to be moved by the theatre is basically irrelevant until it's raised from the level of a personal hankering and made part of some sort of meaningful critical discourse about the place of emotion in our responses to theatre. What of the idea that Great Art could potentially wow the masses - if not quite with the success of Mary Poppins - because of the way it invests spectacle with grand pathos? This is obviously the topic that's hidden behind the crotchety debate about Arts Festival programming. However, it's a topic that needs the attention of someone who's prepared to argue in a sustained way about the relation between art and wider society - a true critic, in other words - not a drunken phrase-maker with a license to kill.

There's no doubt that the position of art in society is changing radically in today's world; high culture in particular is fast turning into a kind of niche product and in the process fast ceasing to be what it was until recently - a much more coherent medium of enjoyment and self-understanding for educated people who saw themselves as setting the cultural tone of society. With high culture, and indeed art in general, transformed into a cultural commodity, a lot of arts journalism exists - in spite of whatever good intentions its authors might have - to spuriously glamourise the product. And this is what Craven, in refusing to communicate intelligibly about art, becomes the ever more tireless, tiresome producer of: bizarre glamorisations of an aesthetic tradition that has come into almost entirely new relations to the society it used to be so central to.  

The deeper reason why Mr Craven can't write starts to become clear: because the great - and admirable - high-mindedness he wants to bring to the role of the arts writer becomes ridiculous when it comes into combination with the Arts Industry as it exists in the present day and age, with its anti-critical and an-aesthetic imperatives: maintaining an artistic star-system, depositing small references to the arts in as many places as possible, bringing the occasional controversy to the boil and artificially maintaining that aura of sublimity we all know art loses when it is rigorously subjected to the logic of sales-volumes and bums-on-seats.

Question: What happens when the imperative to glamourize the artistic product becomes the practical-social driver of your activity as a writer about art? Well, unless you drop the pretence of great critical grandeur, then at the very least the strain starts to show: above all, your language goes on an extended holiday - a round-the-world cruise maybe, on which adverbs go fly kites of their own, assonance runs riot, half of what you say sounds like it comes from a tourist brochure or a real estate catalogue and everything smells heavily of alcohol and sex:

"The novel pulsates with the portent and momentum of revelations Tranter either foreshadows to the point of obviousness or keeps putting further and more far-fetchedly [sic] out of reach. This makes the book's endless foreplay between its thriller elements and its loftily conceived moral dramas and soaring [sic] realism a little bit of a tease. But The Legacy retains a lot of magic along with its roughness. Full of suave and stunning [sic] evocations of Sydney and Manhattan, this sparkling and spacious [sic] novel captures the smell and sap [sic] of young people half in love with everyone they're vividly aware of, and groping to find themselves [sic] like the answer to an erotic enigma." (Peter Craven reviews Kirsten Tranter, The Monthly)

Oh dear. Let's hope there's an editor out there who still has the courage to call this stray ship back to port. The captain's drunk and is doing weird stuff on the bridge. The whole thing's totally sic!

Saturday, May 1, 2010

Gernot Böhme: Techno-Philosophy, Techno-Criticism - Sample No. 2

The Philosophy of Technology

1. Paradigms

The question is why a philosophy of technology should exist in the first place - in any case something that is to be more than philosophy in the trivial sense in which one might speak of a philosophy of skiing or a philosophy of flower-arrangement. Why should there also be a specific discipline known as the philosophy of technology taking its place alongside other philosophical disciplines such as ethics, aesthetics, logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of nature? What gives rise to the question is the paradoxical situation that, on the one hand, the philosophy of technology exists in point of fact (viz. in the form of publications, curricula and professorial chairs), while on the other hand no convincing paradigm of a philosophy of technology has appeared in the field. That may be because philosophy, in any case contemporary philosophy, belongs squarely among the humanities and researchers in the humanities on the whole have only a very superficial knowledge of technology - because few in any case have sought to see the phenomena of technology from the inside. Could this also be why their results have been paltry and in some cases downright dull?

Though it must be said that this assessment is not quite accurate. Enumerating philosophy's subdisciplines already suggests a place for a philosophy of technology under the rubric of the philosophy of nature. When Aristotle for instance divides being-in-general into what exists of its own natural accord and what exists by virtue of technology (phusei on, technē on) in his Physics, this indeed suggests the possibility of developing a philosophy of technology alongside the philosophy of nature; indeed, in light of the proliferation of technology in today's world, the need to do so is urgent. What mode of being could technical devices and objects be assimilated to? The question itself implies that the philosophy of technology would have to be an ontology of technological entities. With his notion of Zeug (material, "stuff"), the Martin Heidegger of Being and Time might provide a pointer: being of a technical nature is "material", Zeug, with the existential character of being ready-to-hand. The latter consists in the usefulness of technological objects. In general they fit inconspicuously into a field of meaning, only becoming noticeable if they cease to be useful, in which case they fall back into a different existential mode - that of being merely present-to-hand. Yet as illuminating as Heidegger's approach is, it really only suits traditional technology, handicraft technology; modern technology is another matter. Heidegger obviously saw the limitation himself and in his later philosophy went on to sketch a philosophy of technology that oversteps all limits.

Moreover, it is not true that the philosophy of technology is altogether lacking in paradigms. Beside the ontological paradigm that derives essentially from Aristotle and Heidegger, we must at least make mention of the paradigms whose roots lie in anthropology and the philosophy of history. The anthropological paradigm goes back to the sophist Protagoras, or rather to Plato, who ascribes it to Protagoras in his dialogue of the same name. On this interpretation of technology, the guiding question is "What is a human being?" Technology is a humanum, a human competence with the help of which human beings compensate for insufficient natural endowments or indeed become capable of getting by in the first place. Technology thus belongs to the essence of being human. Human beings are by nature deficient beings - as Gehlen was to put it in the twentieth century. They are what they are only insofar as they also develop culture. For Plato/Protagoras, social or political skill is part of the picture, not just physical equipment. In Plato the capacity for politics also comes under the heading of technology; it is the technē politike.

The negative estimate of technology implicit in this concept (technology for Plato is merely a makeshift of necessity) already elicited a strong response in antiquity; in its modern re-formulation in the work of Gehlen it is radically re-valued; for Gehlen, technology is no longer a sign of a limitation that animals are not subject to, but a mark of distinction, a capacity through which human beings surpass other animals. Using technology human beings can be free of the given conditions of life, they can emanciplate themselves from the world of nature. Through technology, humanity creates an environment that suits it; technology becomes second nature to it - an idea already to be found in the work of Marx. Admittedly, examples of the use of technology among animals were now identified too - dam-building among beavers and the like; however, even if we assume that the use of technology is in the end something natural to animals, viz. a genetically inherited pattern of behaviour, the difference between the technological worlds of humans and animals nonetheless remains spectacular. Leaving inventors of the ancient world like Daedelus, Heron and Archimedes to one side, since the advent of the modern world technological discovery has come to have a dynamism that connects it in an essential sense with ingenuity (Lat. ingenium). The paradigmatic technologist on this conception is not actually the craftsman but the engineer. In modernity, technology is no longer simply a means of survival, but a means of substantially enhancing life.

This is already to flag the transition to another of our paradigms, this one deriving from the philosophy of history. The anthropological paradigm might be said to take for granted an unchanging relation between human beings and technology; it fails to allow for historical change, even on the technological side of the ledger. Yet the history of technology is a sort of history unto itself and in relating it we can identify the major epochs in the relationship between human beings and technology. The most notable work to do so is not actually a work of philosophy, but a cultural history of nature, Serge Moscovici's Human History of Nature. Though one might not guess from the title, the book is also a cultural history of technology in the sense that it sets out the epochal differences in the characteristic relationship between forms of labour and concepts of nature. Handicraft work here corresponds to nature conceived according to the notions of matter and form, engineering is aligned with nature considered as an interconnected field of force and cybernetics with nature considered synthetically or as a construct. We can also talk here of the epoch of one or another dominant technology - thus of epochs dominated successively by form-giving handicraft technology, by mechanics and industrial technology as organising forces and by the controlling and ordering functions of Information Technology.

An interpretation of technology from the standpoint of the philosophy of history is actually to be found in the first philosophy of technology to explicitly identify itself as such. Ernst Kapp's philosophy of technology could also be subsumed under the anthropological paradigm, viz. insofar as Kapp seeks to interpret various technologies as projections of human bodily organs. In doing so he amplifies the Aristotelian notion of technology (that it imitates nature) by assuming that in technology human beings give external form to the structure of the human organism itself. Yet while the load-bearing structures of bridges may indeed resemble the lamella-structure of the human femur - and while the telephone network can certainly be interpreted as a sort of nervous system - it is of course easy to point to technologies that have no counterpart in the human body (the wheel for one). To be sure, there are grounds for interpreting technology as an imitation of nature. Nature's technical solutions prove time and again to be exemplary in terms of simplicity and efficiency: consider the stability of blades of grass from the structural point of view, the body-shape of the dolphin from the point of view of fluid mechanics, the capacity of the brain to store and process information. Yet imitation, especially today, is by no means unconscious. Rather, it is something based on research, viz. in the field of bionics.

The decisive point of Kapp's philosophy of technology however lies in his integration of technological development into the history of human consciousness. His magnum opus, the Principles of a Philosophy of Technology, is in effect the materialist counterpart to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Just as Hegel tracks the way spirit comes to consciousness of itself in the objective forms of its own works, so Kapp describes the way humans become conscious of themselves as embodied beings in their technological creations. The conceptual figure in Hegel and Kapp is one and the same: self-consciousness is attained by making the implicit explicit. According to Kapp, "self-consciousness thus proves to be the result of a process whereby knowledge of something external is converted into something internal." Just as Hegel thinks that in his very philosophy the world of spirit finally comes full circle, so Kapp thinks human beings achieve true self-consciousness in his Principles of a Philosophy of Technology. In Kapp's quasi-prophetic world-historical terms "the conscious creation of technology might shine brightly in the foreground of human achievement; it remains nothing more than a reflection of the depths of the unconscious, the elaboration of a consciousness that was first redeemed by rudimentary tools."

While Kapp's philosophy of technology is hardly known outside specialist circles, Martin Heidegger's later philosophy of technology has had considerable influence in the history of ideas. What makes this all the more astonishing is that Heidegger consciously positioned himself at a considerable distance from all matters technological both in life and thought. Yet it was probably for just this reason that he hit a raw nerve among those of his contemporaries who were disquieted by technological development. His compact Die Frage nach der Technik (The Question concerning Technology) can be read as a radical criticism of modern technology - on Heidegger's picture a technology that reduces nature to a mere resource, destroys traditional forms of life (and thereby traditional forms of technology too) and in the end turns human beings themselves into mere raw material. Heidegger paints into his highly stylised picture of Geschick ("destining") everything that for the individual appears overwhelming about modern technological developments - everything, indeed, that might be soberly described in terms of the emergence in modernity of a third cultural super-structure alongside the state and the market economy. Under the rubric of Gestell ("enframing"), technology itself becomes an epoch in the history of Being; it is the epoch when Being discloses itself through a technical Herausforderung ("challenging-forth") and thereby withdraws all the more decisively. Yet in the process the role of human beings in maintaining the openness of Being, indeed in maintaining truth itself, becomes open to view - and it is here that Heidegger detects the possibility of deliverance. It is impossible today to go along either with the subtly sanctimonious formula Heidegger borrows from Hölderlin:

"Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst
Das Rettende auch."
("Where the danger is, there too//The saving power grows.")

or his associative style of presentation, haunted as it is by obscure readings of Greek and German etymology. Yet something remains of Heidegger's philosophy of technology that is significant - a view of technology that, like the entire ontological paradigm, goes back to Aristotle. However, here we can speak of a further paradigm, viz. an epistemological paradigmatic model.

In his Nichmochean Ethics, Aristotle enumerates a series of types of knowledge, forms of aletheia. Reason, wisdom, science and ethical insight are on the list, but so too is technology. The high regard for technology as an independent form of knowledge is all the more impressive in that technology doesn't even appear on the graded scale of types of knowledge Plato sets out in the so-called "analogy of the divided line" in The Republic. Though one should not draw the conclusion that Plato's attitude to technology is therefore contemptuous - for example that it involves looking down on artisans as too banausic. On the contrary, it was the expertise of craftsmen that best met Socrates' challenge to his contemporaries' claims to knowledge. Likewise Plato's thorough-going rationalisation of all forms of public activity called for the development of a specific technique - a technike - appropriate to each activity.

In Aristotle technology is characterised as a form of knowledge that guides the fabrication of things. Making things (poiesis) for Aristotle is a form of human action to be distinguished from praxis - the (self-contained) fulfilment of life's activities. Making has its aim in a product or work, whereas the goal of praxis lies in itself.
This is the late Heideggerian point of departure; for Heidegger thinks that with the advent of modern science, all forms of knowledge have come under the domination of the technical model of knowledge. Since Galileo, indeed, it has been in technical contexts, through experimentation and measurement, that nature has been an object of knowledge; according to Descartes' maxim, we should seek to understand nature as the expert craftsman understands the products of his craft: to know something means knowing how it can be fabricated. Science thus becomes an exercise in technically reproducing nature: that at least would be the identifiable meaning of Heidegger's speculations about the history of Being. The epistemological model of technology implicit in the technologist's view of the world becomes the dominant form of knowledge in modernity. The critical potential of Heidegger's philosophy of technology is hence essentially a critique of the modern world-view - a critique of science similar to what we find in Goethe's Theory of Colour and continuing all the way through to Habermas' Science and Technology as "Ideology" and the phenomenology of the present-day. Goethe and the phenomenologists object to the technical model of knowledge by opposing it to a knowledge that establishes a personally meaningful subjectively coloured orientation with the help of a systematic description of phenomena. Critical Theory on the other hand objects to the technical model of knowledge on the grounds that it is technocratic. What Aristotle calls poiesis and  praxis has its place in a critical theorist such as Habermas under the rubric of purposive-rational action or interaction. In opposition to technocratic knowledge, critical theory posits a form of knowledge capable of effecting practical change through critical reflection about existing social circumstances - reflection that is guided through and through by what Horkheimer called "an interest in rational conditions."

Sunday, February 28, 2010

The Art of Having Something to Say: Part 9 - Oscar Wilde

From: The Critic as Artist (1891)

Anybody can write a three-volume novel. It merely requires a complete ignorance of life and literature. The difficulty the reviewer feels is the difficulty of sustaining any standard. Where there is no style, a standard must be impossible. The poor reviewers are apparently reduced to be the reporters for the police-court of literature, the chroniclers of the doing of the habitual criminals of art.

Society often forgives the criminal; it never forgives the dreamer. The beautiful sterile emotions that art excites in us are hateful in its eyes, and so completely are people dominated by the tyranny of this dreadful social ideal that they are always coming shamelessly up to one at Private Views and other places that are open to the general public, and saying in a loud stentorian voice, "What are you doing?" whereas "What are you thinking?" is the only question that any single civilised being should ever be allowed to whisper to another.

It is to do nothing that the elect exist. Action is limited and relative. Unlimited and absolute is the vision of him who sits at ease and watches, who walks in loneliness and dreams. But we who are born at the close of this wonderful age are at once too cultured and too critical, too intellectually subtle, to accept any speculations about life in exchange for life itself. To us the heavenly city is colourless, and the enjoyment of God without meaning. Metaphysics do not satisfy our temperaments, and religious ecstasy is out of date. The world through which the Academic philosopher becomes "the spectator of all time and of all existence" is not really an ideal world, but simply a world of abstract ideas. When we enter it, we starve amidst the chill mathematics of thought. The courts of the city of God are not open to us now. Its gates are guarded by Ignorance, and to pass them we have to surrender all that in our nature is most divine.

Just as Nature is matter struggling into mind, so Art is mind expressing itself under the conditions of matter, and thus, even in the lowliest of her manifestations, she speaks to both sense and soul alike.

For he to whom the present is the only thing that is present, knows nothing of the age in which he lives. To realise the nineteenth century, one must realise every century that has preceded it and that has contributed to its making. To know anything about oneself one must know all about others.

England will never be civilised till she has added Utopia to her dominions. There is more than one of her colonies that she might with advantage surrender for so fair a land. What we want are unpractical people who see beyond the moment, and think beyond the day. Those who try to lead the people can only do so by following the mob. It is through the voice of one crying out in the wilderness that the ways of the gods must be prepared.

The security of society lies in custom and unconscious instinct, and the basis of the stability of society, as a healthy organism, is the complete absence of any intelligence amongst its members. The great majority of people being fully aware of this, rank themselves naturally on the side of that splendid system that elevates them to the dignity of machines, and rage so wildly against the intrusion of the intellectual faculty into any question that concerns life, that one is tempted to define man as a rational animal who always loses his temper when he is called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason.

Action being limited would have left Shakespeare unsatisfied and unexpressed; and just as it is because he did nothing that he has been able to achieve everything, so it is because he never speaks to us of himself in his plays that his plays reveal him to us absolutely, and show us his true nature and temperament far more completely than do those strange and exquisite sonnets even, in which he bares to crystal eyes the secret closet of his heart. Yes, the objective form is the most subjective in matter. Man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth.

It is to the soul that Art speaks, and the soul may be made the prisoner of the mind as well as of the body. One should, of course, have no prejudices; but . . .it is one's business in such matters to have preferences, and when one has preferences ones ceases to be fair. It is only an auctioneer who can equally and impartially admire all schools of Art.

There is much to be said in favour of modern journalism. By giving us the opinions of the uneducated, it keeps us in touch with the ignorance of the community. By carefully chronicling the current events of contemporary life, it show us of what very little importance such events really are. By invariably discussing the unnecessary, it makes us understand what things are requisite for culture, and what are not. But it should not allow poor Tartuffe to write articles upon modern art.

Some limitation might well, and will soon, I hope, be placed upon some of our newspapers and newspaper writers. For they give us the bald, sordid, disgusting facts of life. They chronicle, with degrading avidity, the sins of the second-rate, and with the conscientiousness of the illiterate give us accurate and prosaic details of the doings of people of absolutely no interest whatsoever.

The real artist is he who proceeds, not from feeling to form, but from form to thought and passion. He does not first conceive an idea, and then say to himself, "I will put my idea into a complex metre of fourteen lines," but realising the beauty of the sonnet-scheme, he conceives certain modes of music and methods of rhyme, and the mere form suggests what is to fill and make it intellectually and emotionally complete. From time to time the world cries out against some charming artistic poet, because, to use its hackneyed and silly phrase, he has "nothing to say." But if he had something to say, he would probably say it, and the result would be tedious. It is just because he had no new message that the can do beautiful work. He gains his inspiration from form, and from form purely, as an artist should. A real passion would ruin him. Whatever actually occurs is spoiled for art. All bad poetry springs from genuine feeling. To be natural is to be obvious, and to be obvious is to be inartistic.

The demand of the intellect, as has been well said, is simply to feel itself alive. The critic may, indeed, desire to exercise influence; but, if so, he will concern himself not with the individual, but with the age, which he will seek to wake into consciousness, and to make responsive, creating in it a new desires and appetites, and lending it his larger vision and his nobler moods.

People sometimes say that fiction is getting too morbid. As far as psychology is concerned, it has never been morbid enough. We have merely touched the surface of the soul, that is all. In one single ivory cell of the brain there are stored away things more marvellous and more terrible than even they have dreamed of, who, like the author of Le Rouge et le Noir, have sought to track the soul into its most secret places, and to make life confess its dearest sins.

It is certain that the subject-matter at the disposal of creation is always diminishing, while the subject-matter of criticism increases daily. There are always new attitudes for the mind, and new points of view. The duty of imposing form upon chaos does not grown less as the world advances. There was never a time when Criticism was more needed than it is now. It is only by its means that Humanity can become conscious of the point at which it has arrived.

England has done one thing; it has invented and established Public Opinion, which is an attempt to organise the ignorance of the community, and to elevate it to the dignity of physical force.

It is Criticism, again, that by concentration makes culture possible. It takes the cumbersome mass of creative work, and distils it into a finer essence. Who that desires to retain any sense of form could struggle through the monstrous multitudinous of books that the world has produced, books in which thought stammers or ignorance brawls? The thread that is to guide us across the wearisome labyrinth is in the hands of Criticism.

In art there is so such thing as a universal truth. A Truth in art is that whose contradictory is also true. And just as it is only in art-criticism, and through it, that we can apprehend the Platonic theory of ideas, so it is only in art-criticism, and through it, that we can realise Hegel's system of contraries. The truths of metaphysics are the truths of masks.

Monday, February 22, 2010

What is The Great Stage?

"A review of the reviewers might at long last yield an idea or two about art and writing. For wouldn't such a meta-review make clear one or two authentic feelings of distress about Art's pitiful condition in this an-aesthetic era of artistic over-production? The poetry, novels, essays and anthologies themselves have nothing to say. They refer, if they refer to anything, to a lost time in which these forms of literary art had form, when Time itself had time and made a present of it to Art, which can manifestly not arise in a world that no longer believes in Eternity, when no one with the ability to write could have faith that the future would grant him readers that are any different from those he sees around him: those infernal writer-readers who are all just about to drop the pose of readerly attention and begin to shout into the latest digitised megaphone of egotism. You seek in vain amid the literature of today for world-views. You look up from your book and find tvs and billboards and inadvertently come across the closest you can get to Weltanschauungen nowadays: Anschauungen, which is to say – rapaciously multiplying percepts."

- or so I thought three years ago.

The Great Stage is turning out to be something more than than the open-ended exercise in criticism it was originally intended as. Still, for the sake of partial self-definition, here's a draft of the answer to the question "What is the Great Stage?" that dates from the early days.

"The Great Stage is a response to a three-fold critical malaise:

1. Print media in Australia is visibly faltering. At present the only dynamic aspect of Australian newspaper culture would seem to be the interaction between the business models of the supermarket managers in command and the tabloid-cum-glossy fare they judge can be sold to the largest number of readers. Under such conditions, the public function of revieweing and criticism is becoming harder to sustain as the culture pages of major broadsheets fill up with monster-sized pictures, interview-pieces, endless food and wine tips and the diary-like musings of celebrity columnists. The 800-word book review – already of limited use for the purposes of the critic – is itself coming to seem a luxury; for a long time it has formed part of the penumbra of a life-style journalism with most of the qualities of advertising (even if it appears above the line separating paid publicity from what claims the reader's attention on other grounds).

2. Universities have ceased to offer critics meaningful points of intellectual contact, much less places of refuge. Our educational institutions were once one of two indispensable reference points of critical activity: in the person of the critic, the relatively heady world of academic scholarship remained connected with the everyday reality of the theatre, the studio and the writer’s corner. By contrast, today universities’ very intellectual function is under threat as "serious scholarship is replaced by an entrepreneurial striving for research money and media attention." (Harry Redner) In short, criticism and academic life until recently belonged together as part of the same cultural manifold – both offered something to the artist, because both sought to give shape to free intellectual perspectives. In an era like our own when university education is subject to the equally sterile logic of bureaucratic control and free market economics, that ceases to be the case in a radical sense. Free critical activity and routinised academic life have come to mutually exclude each other; the social sciences and humanities in particular have increasingly become the haunt of radical academic conformists who dish up their sensibilities for the book market, shuffle their specialities between journals and conferences, deliver up their mechanical models of mind and society to a passively assenting public or join the ranks of administrative power-brokers and let fly with that disgraceful mixture of bombast and blandness with which our universities are expected to procedurally justify themselves.

3. The net poses a range of very different problems, though as the social domain freest of political constraints it remains the obvious place to launch a venture in general criticism. Yet the dilemmas of specialisation which present an obstacle to general criticism in the world-beyond-the-net are often reproduced online at a higher level of complexity; the generalism required to interpret art in relation to the social and cultural problematics of our day is even less likely to emerge in a virtual world where every fragment of an idea generates its own authoritative-looking pronouncements within its own teeming online enclosure. And that’s not even getting started on the raft of further problems the web generates for the critic. Foremost among them is the problem of.taking critical responsibility: in a medium where too many writers let fly with their opinions from behind a veil of anonymity, criticism either fails to develop or degenerates into self-important snark; where speech acts take on the quality of sound-bites for quasi-technical reasons – where the sheer volume of speech determines the speaker’s visibility – two essential aspects of criticism, analysis and interpretation, fall away and a third, evaluation, is radically abbreviated. . . So if yours truly is going to get a spot of criticism going, he might have to take evasive action against all sorts of things – against the purveyors of cheap ironies – against the army of sub-commentators for whom being online means first and foremost giving up on self-control - against all who spare themselves the labour of the concept, in order to be ready with the snappiest instantaneous assessments of everything the world of art and writing have to offer." 

Truly,

CS