Saturday, September 18, 2010

Pseuds Corner - No.10

- an occasional selection of the worst of the Australian media-sphere, with particular attention to arts and political commentary that is pompous, pretentious, over-written, self-important, knowing instead of knowledgeable, name-dropping, euphemistic, cliche'd or sloppily written to the point of meaninglessness. . .

Cave's saturnine persona refutes Australian national optimism and its chirpy creed of "No worries". This is why he was so intent on colaborating with Kylie. One druggy evening in March in 1992, he persuaded a fan to give him a little pink and baby-blue plastic bag with Kylie's name on it, now on show at the National Library; he toted the candy-coloured trinket around the world, hoping it transmitted a message. In 1996 she fell for the bait and sweetly permitted him to slay her in "Where the Wild Roses Grow". They make an odd couple in the video. Frankenstein's lumbering monster has apparently convinced Ramsay St's fluffy, sugary Charlene to go out on a date. It was a sacrificial act, designed to ravage the suburban Australia of barbequed nature strips, trilling budgies and unstained laundry happily flapping on rotary clothes lines. - Cave has compared Australia to the Holy Land, but only because its terrain is so stark and unhallowed . . . "More flies than at the Cruxifiction", comments Euchrid in And the Ass Saw the Angel, futilely brushing away the winged filth that crawls on his skin. Who but an Australian, picturing Golgotha, would listen for the hum and drone of the blowies that surely converged on Christ's succulent wounds? (Peter Conrad, The Monthly)

I’m a morning person if you accept that morning is a state of mind, beginning when you decide it should. I think Descartes said something like you shouldn’t let anyone get you out of bed until you’re good and ready if you want to do decent mathematics. In a perfect world, it would be the same with writing, of course. But even on little sleep the morning can be golden for creative work, the brain surprisingly deft, somehow reborn. (Kristel Thornell on the meaning of morning, Melbourne Writers Festival blog)

I’ve been in a lot of aeroplanes lately – flying out from Melbourne, flying in novels, and in dreams. Sometimes the ports look similar. Familiar, unfamiliar. My life is literature, is writing, is reading, and always passion, and there are good and bad things about being intertwined with fiction, about consistent imagining. It can be expansive, but also irrepressible. It can thrill or bother me at three o’clock in the morning. - But then, flying somewhere to talk about it - to share on stage, in a workshop, over a glass of wine - these habitations of the mind, connections formed on the page, worlds opened up, emotional educations or confirmations. - The next chance to do this is somewhere close to where I grew up – Byron Bay. I can’t wait to dig my feet in the sand, and to dig deep into the minds of authors. (Angela Meyer on being a Busy Byron Bay Writers Festival Bee, Literary Minded)


Want to know my favourite sex toy? My wooden spoon. I use it to cook lamb stir-fry, sweet potato soup and Mediterranean vegetable frittata. Another bedroom aid? The duster, broom or nappy wipes. . . You can imagine the dream scenario: as I approach 35, my life is part Voltaire, part Viagra. When I'm not cooking three dinners, wiping snot out of my daughter's eyes, or impaling my foot on Lego starships, my wife and I are enjoying tender hours of lovemaking. . . I jest, but the 'Mentally Sexy Dad' is a real phenomenon. The brainchild of blogger Clint Greagen at Reservoir Dad, the competition celebrates men who're committed to a more balanced family life. It's a reminder: men who clean, cook and parent are hot stuff. . . This is the logic behind Reservoir Dad's competition. In an irreverent way, Clint is trying to highlight the attractiveness of alternative masculine domesticity. Of course this involves a little beefcake: bulging guns or tight bums in little undies. But this is only the most obvious allure. More than anything else, these are men who refuse to be bound by traditional gender roles. They can be tough, brawny and probably boozy - but they also wash, cook, clean and kid-wrangle. In this, the competition, also running the United States, is a celebration of today's real new age man: not stereotypically emasculated or wimpy, but caring, careful and committed. It's not a denial of what most men in Western societies do. It's an expansion of it: showing how their energy and perseverance can be broadened and enriched; how they can be bigger men, not in waistline, but in spirit. They're 'mentally sexy' because they've given their responsibilities and ideals thought, and demonstrated will, intelligence and foresight. It's about the allure of the soul, not just the biceps. (Damon Young, "Mentally sexy dads", ABC The Drum Unleashed)

Thank God I am not a squid, I think as I watch the unimaginable ordeals of so many animals; thank God I am not a gannet chick swallowed alive by a pelican; thank God I am not expected once a year to crawl up cliffs a million times higher than myself?. - Perhaps some of the gratification of nature documentaries is in reminding us of our own animal truths. . . Life reminds me of a favourite poem by Mary Oliver, Wild Geese, simple and moving because it speaks of the knowledge we have when we shiver in cold, when we are hungry, when we are frightened: that we are warm, living beasts, no less, little more:
You do not have to be good.
You do not have to walk
on your knees for a
hundred miles through
the desert, repenting.
You only have to let the
soft animal of your body
love what it loves. (Kate Holden, "A cosmos of wonders imparts its cosy glow", The Age)

I was startled by Professor Gillian Whitlock's reading of my essay 'After the Academy' (Australian Book Review, June/July 2002). She appears to think that my choice of 'romantic', 'organic' tropes and of such generally non-U discourses as 'settler autobiographics' was unwitting, and that I had somehow managed to get through seventeen years as a full time academic without achieving self-awareness in my own writing practice, and without being so much as touched by the ideas or the language by which I was surrounded. . .
There is, of course, no such thing as ME (I take it this was a laboured pun on campus-specific essentialist crimes; if not, it is now), and if Professor Whitlock claims to have no heart or soul then who am I to argue? As far as the development of the academic self over time is concerned, there can be no clear distinction between the 'sandstones' and the 'gumleaves', for most of us are the hybrid offspring of both, or perhaps I should say that our selves are constructed on the site where the various discourses circulating around both intersect. (Kerryn Goldsworthy responds to Gillian Whitlock, Australian Humanities Review)

The Almodóvar that was before us had all the suspense and sparkle in the world. - Yes, and by the grace of God, most of the acting was superb. Wendy Hughes had just the right kind of hauteur and quivering warmth as the famous actress who is besotted with her girlfriend and is the unwitting destroyer of the boy. This is a big handsome performance in the role that was recreated on the London stage by Diana Rigg, and Hughes gives it a sort of bewildered vulnerability in the midst of decaying magnificence that is splendid and also splendidly matched by Peta Sergeant, who sizzles with sexiness and self-pity as the damaged damsel who is her Stella and her Atthis. . .
Some of the other parts are, admittedly, played a bit cheesily. Katie Fitchett was too much a sketch of bouncy goodness and then long-suffering nobility as the nun who gets pregnant and then infected with HIV. And Jolyon James is far too effete and goonish as the actor who plays Stanley, but he’s a lot better as the missing father in drag. - This is not a flawless production but it is full of a wild energy and a counter-balancing grace that delivers a contemporary masterpiece full of all the dramatic and cinematic echoes in the world, which is all at once full of life and of the magic that gives it form. (Peter Craven, "Comedy and energy - and tears" Australian Spectator)

Sunday, September 5, 2010

Peter Craven: Why I Can't Write

- with apologies to G. Orwell

A bit of a follow-up to the Peter Craven edition of Pseuds Corner a while back. A few things have been pointed out to me by the Stage's 5.5 readers that bear on the Craven case and I think are worth repeating.

The argument from one quarter was that the Special Edition neglected to give the impression that Mr C can at times write better prose than what was on display in the 7 extracts I picked on a few weeks ago. This recent op-ed piece was cited as an example:

"Would that politics in this country were as well run as the ABC's political panel show Q and A - on a good day. Television transforms our apprehension of politics by its vividness, its accuracy and the sense of occasion with which it presents it. - Q and A began only last year, but is already essential to the political landscape. It presents a panel that includes a member each from the government and the opposition, a couple of journalists or intellectuals, perhaps someone from business or a think tank - five in all plus the presenter (Lateline's Tony Jones) - and subjects them to live questions from the audience plus a sprinkling sent in electronically. The format works superbly, highlighting both the political skill of our politicians and the fact that there is a lot more to the governing of a country than mere party political differences." (Peter Craven, "Question: What makes tv great? Answer: Q and A" The Age)

There's no doubt it's better written, though I'd hardly say that makes exhibits (a) through (g) from the Special Edition any more excusable, either from the point of view of Craven as a writer or that of his editors.

The argument from another quarter, precisely along these lines, was that the case against Craven's writing made in the Special Edition actually didn't go far enough. James of Coburg made the point that if he had submitted a single line of the prose from exhibits (a) through (g) to the editors of any of Australia's major literary publications then he would probably have been told straight-up that he was writing unpublishable drivel.

In the case of submissions (a) through to (g), professional editing would have meant refusing Mr Craven column space on the grounds of egregious lack of merit, coherence and substance, though some exceptions, James suggested, might be made for exhibits (c), (d) and (e), which, to quote James himself, "are more in the nature of a gossip column". (Decide for yourself whether the Lilian Frank persona Craven adopts for his Australian Spectator column is innocuous or intellectually offensive. I'm happy to concede James's point: lowering literary standards is fair enough if the only point of a piece really is to let Peter let the world know he saw Eddie and Carla Maguire at the latest Mary Poppins production.)

James's more important point though is that Mr Craven is being seriously indulged by many of the major editorial powers in the land, who, in publishing material of the - to use a Cravenism - loose baggy monstrousness of exhibits (a) through (g) are effectively refusing to edit. In this, I have to say, I agree. Like James, I find it hard to believe that a sane editor who'd been set the task of exercising his/her professional skills on exhibits (a) through (g) - from behind a veil of anonymity for instance - would have failed to apply the red pencil to every sentence even vaguely like this one:

"The easiest way into Rothwell is via Another Country, because that book makes clear without any overwhelming baroque turbulence that we are dealing with a cultivated sensibility, all but flypapered with the culture of Europe, the kind of bloke who jumped on a plane to see, as soon as possible, a newly rediscovered Titian in eastern Europe, who is steeped in the literary power of the 19th-century Australian explorers and is alive not only to his own desire for illumination and the potential for personal enlightenment and spiritual excruciation that comes from exploration (in all its literal and metaphorical ambivalence); but who is also, in a worldly sense, open to the fact that "spiritual tourism", like the taste for Aboriginal art, is a growth industry and a collective sussurration of which his own whispering is a part." ("Appointment with the sublime", ALR)

I also agree with James that there are aspects of grotesque awfulness to Mr Craven's prose - and his general mindset - that I actually left out of my initial collection. The list of excesses and foibles I started the Craven edition of Pseuds Corner with wasn't meant to be exhaustive and I now think I could've come up with a better list. At the top of it would have to go Craven's love of superfine comparisons between the works - or even the whole literary oeuvres - of his favourite literary geniuses - sometimes 4 or 5 per paragraph. To quote the above splurge about Nicholas Rothwell again:

"Of course, putting it like this is unfair to Rothwell, whose work is as moving and eloquent and imaginative (and as willing to stare down the truth no matter what mesmerising abyss it lurks in) as contemporary writing can be. But he is at the same time at an edge of artifice and distinctiveness where a lot of wise heads and smart money are liable to reject him. What was it that Dr Johnson said of Milton? That, as Ben Jonson had earlier said of Spenser, he writ no language, that he wrote a Babylonish dialect? And wasn't it Joseph Conrad, himself a latter-day Homer of the sea, who said of that most Miltonic of prose epics, Moby Dick, that it didn't have a single line of sincerity in it? - This is the hyperbole of the anti-hyperbolic. . . Rothwell is a remarkable writer and he has the exorbitant pretentiousness that goes with everything that is exquisite and mandarin and expectant about his whole endeavour. - Whether he's waiting for God or Godot in the desert doesn't matter, or only to him. His Northern Territory is a kind of junkyard of the detritus of a formidable if decadent European cultivation, but who could object, that's how Dostoyevsky saw the West and its gaming tables: with cold, engrossed eyes."
 
"In one way it's a form of landscape novel writing in which the world of characters in an ongoing drama is replaced by the brooding consciousness of the narrator who, by necessity, arrogates to himself whatever more or less Wordsworthian fascinations interiority and its thousand minute modulations might disclose. - V.S. Naipaul's The Enigma of Arrival is one kind of locus classicus of this kind of writing, the fiction of Gerald Murnane is another. It is, in any case, a form of documentary fiction-making that realigns fiction (or non-fiction, because it confounds the distinction) with the long backward arch of Romantic poetry. You can no more argue with Sebald's The Rings of Saturn than you can with Wordsworth's Prelude or - if you want to change the game a little - with T.S. Eliot's Four Quartets  and Rilke's Duino Elegies."  (Peter Craven, "Appointment with the sublime", Australian Literary Review, The Australian)

Prima facie, what we have here is a species of literary name-dropping, which was something I did suggest Craven did a lot of, along with (a) invoking High Art as a quasi-metaphysical value, (b) theatrically purporting to explain himself without explaining anything, (c) coining bizarre metaphors (d) badly imitating the earthy side of Robert Hughes and (e) referring to God for rhetorical effect. In a more rigorous survey of Mr Craven's prose-style though, the superfine comparisons and general analogy-mongering, I can see now, would belong in a different category to the vulgar "met Charlotte and Cate for lunch"-style shop-talk.

The reason why material like the ghastly Rothwell review belongs in a category of its own will be obvious to anyone who's ever opened the arts pages of an Australian newspaper looking for a critical interpretation whose basic line of thought he can follow: all the huff and puff about great writers in Craven's reviews endlessly defers the point where he has to justify his responses, as opposed to giving his readers unargued demonstrations of his own overwhelming knowledgeability. Yes, the tone is so snobbish it's ridiculous, based as it is on the premiss that normal readers of the The Australian could mentally reference the nuances contained in a library-worth of books with the ease that Craven appears to be able to do so. But much more important than that is the fact that writing like Craven's bears very little thinking about. Read it and imagine yourself putting the question to Mr C "How would you actually flesh out that grand-sounding analogy between St Paul and Montaigne, Nicholas Rothwell and Milton, Mahler and Cormac McCarthy, Kodi Smit-Macphee and the patriarch Abraham etc etc etc?" What could Craven possibly say? All I can imagine is a sort of authoritative pre-discursive groan, signifying something like "CAN'T YOU SEE I'M VERY CULTURED! (Get you gone.)"

However, bad writing created by a desire to seem massively well-read is maybe only part of Craven's problem. The other half of the problem is the result of a bad mental habit and here again more needs to be said about how Craven gets himself into it. My sense is this. For Craven, the basic game of reviewing is to indicate in a roundabout way what the aesthetic experience of a book or a film reminds him of, which turns out to be another aesthetic experience. The reviews then spend much of their time joining the dots between these singular points of personal aesthetic experience without communicating the least part of the content of that experience to the reader.

Another grave problem for Craven that I didn't mention in the Pseuds Special Edition are all those sentences choking on linguistic fetish-items: the "rich and strange" stock-phrases that read like the first things that enter Mr C's mind rather than fully-formed subject-plus-predicate-style thoughts about the matter at hand. When Craven is at his worst, the bold metaphors simply get thrown together to create a sort of chaotic high-toned poetry:

"In that respect, as in others, McCarthy is the heir of Hemingway, with a thundering command of action that enthrals, though his cadences are stately and artful and the feeling that runs through his books encompasses the pity and the terror and the tears in things. You begin reading All the Pretty Horses, which opens his Border Trilogy, thinking that you are experiencing the Platonic idea of escapist writing because you are enjoying a cowboy book for the first time since you were ten only to discover that this is no reanimation of the delights of childhood. It is a [sic] Kindertotenlieder. . .

From the outset, the film [of McCarthy's The Road] skilfully establishes the moral gravity that underlines the horror-style narrative momentum. The father's narration tells us that if God's voice does not come through the child, then he never spoke a word. And so it goes as father and son move over the bleached and devastated landscapes of some rural Pennsylvania or Oregon of the mind, some Montana that may be coterminous with a world where men rove like wolves."("Baby Dante and Apocalypse" ABR) [my italics. Ed]

What is basically at issue in McCarthy as a novellist and in the film versions of The Road in particular? What are the basic themes here? Isn't that the simplest question that the reader of a review might expect to get an answer to? Can Mr C answer it? Well, he can run through the plot of The Road, throwing in semantically unmotivated references to Platonic ideas, "literary high-jinks", the "tears of being", a "Montana of the mind", seeing various things through a glass darkly, "all that is red and tooth in claw" - oh and "the ineffable" (which he proceeds to say an eff'ing lot about).

But how does McCarthy's novel actually work? How does McCarthy's literary apocalyptic or Hillcoat's film version of it relate to the reality of our present world or that of the future? Admittedly these aren't the most sophisticated literary critical questions. But if as a reviewer you can't even give a vague sense of an answer, your review just doesn't belong on the arts pages of a broadsheet newspaper. The trouble with Mr C as a reviewer is that he rarely answers any of these sorts of entry-level questions about structure or significance and the constipated prose-style is part of the reason why: Craven habitually spends so much of his time in most of his reviews chewing and re-chewing the same pet phrases that he fails to give a critical impression of a book or get across a coherent line of thought about it.

If we were just talking about a literary tic that we had to ignore in order to get to the analysis, interpretation and evaluation that form the essence of any really substantial criticism then maybe it'd all be worth it. But in Craven's case, the reviews seem to be all tic and no text. On a good day, Craven can indicate, in a roundabout way (roughly as he does in his response to Q and A) whether he thinks something is good or bad, pointless or worthy: the evaluative bit. But most of the time, he's so busy tweaking silly phrases that analysis, interpretation and evaluation are nowhere in sight.

*

Six months ago, Gideon Haigh sparked medium-level controversy in the literary world by suggesting that Australian criticism is nowadays light-on and uninspired. Book reviews in particular, according to Haigh, are increasingly being farmed out to general staff writers who, in the absence of special knowledge, drown the reader in vague impressions and almost never venture strong-minded critical opinions. Yet while it's true nowadays that Australian literary editors seem to have a preference for favourable reviews, especially of local fare, there's a double-edge to this particular sword and I'm guessing Haigh is aware of it. The trouble is that there's something far worse than reviewers giving everyone who managed to get into print an encouragement award. And that's reviewers giving what they don't like an unargued critical caning.

"Bestial metaphor abounds in Shakespeare's tale of sexual jealousy. Director Peter King takes his cue from it, entering the jungle of physical theatre to deliver a production canopied by a writhing tableau of carnal play. . . [Annie] Last's Desdemona carved out an unlikely wedge of dignity for herself. King's work, as he puts it, ''continues to disdain naturalism, whatever that may be''. - It's the kind of statement that makes naturalism seem like pornography: you can't describe it, but you know it when you see it. - In fact, Shakespeare is both naturalistic and not. To the extent that the burgeoning sensuality of King's conception accentuates the trauma at the heart of Othello, it's fair enough. - But this production seems more interested in playing with itself than to the audience, and some of its rude tricks seem to be compensating for a lack of technique." (Cameron Woodhead reviews "Othello" at fortyfivedownstairs, The Age)

Ignore the wretched word painting. (Anyone up for a ticket to a production "canopied by a writhing tableau of carnal play"?!) There's another thing that Craven and his protégés are very good at. And that is filling out reviews with casual put downs. Take the pointless sneer from Mr C himself at the end of this paragraph:

"With the passage of the years Waiting for Godot has come to seem less like a shocking paradigm of absurdity and more like the deep sad comedy of a continuing condition (call it human if you must). As with Eliot’s Waste Land, the brilliance of the comic surface has almost outlived the existential insecurity it is shaping. - Sean Mathias’s quietly brilliant production takes this fact as its opportunity by constantly emphasising the mature human face of the grinding rituals through which his two ageing tramps wait and wander (wittily and witlessly) as Godot puts them through their paces in his failure to come. McKellen and Rees, in contrasted ways, have the rueful stoicism of age, and their comic embrace of catastrophe — McKellen’s boggle-eyed and flailing, Rees’s dapper and wincing — is light years from the contorted angst of young actors with the world before them as an enigmatic agony." (Peter Craven reviews Sean Mathias' "Waiting for Godot", The Spectator)

Off we go again. The stars of Craven's literary canon twinkle brightly. In the foreground phrases get made, phrases get murdered, the storehouses of the English language are laid waste in the search for a maximally colourful figure of speech or an intermediate term in a world-historical literary analogy. The Craven caning that comes at the end of the paragraph is a model of how not to proceed as an intellectually responsible critic: spend most of your time cueing your readers as to how well-read you are, denigrate your critical object by rhetorically screwing up your face - never put it in a context in which its failings become comprehensible from a broader point of view.

The vague swipes are more than faintly insulting to artists and readers alike. And perhaps the only excuse Australian arts editors have for filling out review pages with tepid positivity is to avoid the negative consequences of badly-written reviews that attitudinise instead of arguing in just this style. Tepid critical praise for every work has one advantage over nasty pseudery. It avoids everyone involved in the arts, including your newspaper's dwindling readership, from feeling justifiably offended. 

*

Now, there are people in the Australian arts world who are willing to call Craven on his sloppy intellectual habits and the poor standard of his writing. From memory, Gideon Haigh didn't single out Mr C for special treatment at Readings six months ago. Alison Croggon by contrast has been consistently willing to do so, for instance in this hard-hitting reply to Craven.

For the sake of background, here's a moderately pseudish snippet from the comment-piece by Mr C that got on Croggon's nerves:

"Naturalism and disruptive high jinks: the theatre needs both. Yes, we need a writer's theatre that is also an actor's theatre, where the director serves the text and highlights — and disciplines — the strength of the actor. We need Rush and Steve Sewell and a director such as Kate Cherry, who can quietly find the music in a Hannie Rayson play. Maybe in the end we need it more than the declamatory atonal music of Andrews and Kosky. - Half the trouble with Australian theatre is caused by talented directors who feel they are above realism and well-made plays. Often they cut their teeth with student theatre and have been too narcissistic to grow up. It's much easier to treat student actors like puppets and to improvise a text than it is to treat Judy Davis like that. Most cut-and-paste postmodern tinkerings with classics make Joanna Murray-Smith look like Racine on a good day. But for every production such as Osage, there's hand-me-down cardboard rubbish of the traditional kind. - We want the best actors commanding the respect of directors who will allow the best of our playwrights to take their places alongside the Pirandellos and Greeks. A theatre which is ancient and modern, classic and cutting-edge, Australian and internationalist, with a deep instinctive sense that to make it new, you have to have a theatrical eye for the glitter of the old. Where is naturalism in all this? Well, we need a theatre that has emotional truth, and we need a theatre that understands the magic of its own artifice." ("The trouble with Australian theatre", The National Times)

As ever, the main argument gets lost in the muddy swirl of tenuous comparisons. It shouldn't take a paragraph with fifteen proper names to tell us that in Mr C's opinion Australian theatre needs to strike a balance between naturalism and experimental disruption. However, without a definition of his main terms (naturalism//"disruptive high jinks", mainstream vs experimental theatre, emotional truth vs deconstruction of traditions), even that relatively simple point evaporates into thin air. The run-through of recent productions by major Australian theatre companies in the rest of the piece contains plenty of examples that seem to fall on both sides of the apparent divide between naturalism and "disruptive high jinks", so you fast end up wondering what the complaint that there's too much "disruption" really amounts to.

Croggon's point is essentially the one about definitions and it's very well taken: surely no one who had thought a little about the term "mainstream theatre" would be silly enough to claim that most mainstream products are particularly "naturalistic", or that the popularity of mainstream shows follows from any notable adherence to "naturalism". In short, Craven - to the extent that he is arguing anything at all - is re-hashing an age-old debate between naturalism and its opponents - a debate which any sophisticated critic ought to know is completely unresolvable when framed in these simplistic terms. For anyone who didn't do Aesthetics 101, let it be said that in the Nineteenth Century, the advocates of aesthetic naturalism extolled naturalism as an escape from arbitrary stylisation, while the advocates of aesthetic anti-naturalism condemned it as a step backwards from the reality-sublimating and reality-subverting functions of art itself. Anyone with a rough grasp of the history of criticism can see that insisting on a "theatre of emotional truth", as Craven does, loads the dice against art which doesn't take truth or emotion as the measure of aesthetic significance. More than that, arguing for naturalism in this simple-minded way overlooks the relatively obvious point that naturalism is itself a form of artifice - one which in some circumstances becomes less than fully aware of itself and under the conditions of mass cultural spectacle often leads to nothing but the repetition of emotional cliche's and psychological stereotypes.

In any case, the sort of ideal Australian theatre that Craven manages to build out of his insistence on "emotional truth" is so vague as to be largely meaningless. A theatre with a "deep instinctive sense that to make it new you have to keep an eye on the glitter of the old"? A theatre that "understands the magic of its own artifice"? What on earth would that amount to specifically? I suppose here at least we can be glad that Craven's pseudo-ideal is captured in a sentence with a beginning that relates to its middle and end according to a principle other than literary free association. Still if the actual content of the ideal would make a meaningful difference to theatre programming or theatrical practice, then Craven leaves us clueless how.

If I had to guess what Mr C is trying to say at this point - it's that he wants to be emotionally moved when he goes to the theatre - that Great Art is deeply moving and so could be truly popular if it weren't being screwed up by "narcissistic" avant-gardists. Let's take it that that's what Craven would be saying if he weren't beating about the bush. Let's also take it that Mr C's desire to be moved by the theatre is basically irrelevant until it's raised from the level of a personal hankering and made part of some sort of meaningful critical discourse about the place of emotion in our responses to theatre. What of the idea that Great Art could potentially wow the masses - if not quite with the success of Mary Poppins - because of the way it invests spectacle with grand pathos? This is obviously the topic that's hidden behind the crotchety debate about Arts Festival programming. However, it's a topic that needs the attention of someone who's prepared to argue in a sustained way about the relation between art and wider society - a true critic, in other words - not a drunken phrase-maker with a license to kill.

There's no doubt that the position of art in society is changing radically in today's world; high culture in particular is fast turning into a kind of niche product and in the process fast ceasing to be what it was until recently - a much more coherent medium of enjoyment and self-understanding for educated people who saw themselves as setting the cultural tone of society. With high culture, and indeed art in general, transformed into a cultural commodity, a lot of arts journalism exists - in spite of whatever good intentions its authors might have - to spuriously glamourise the product. And this is what Craven, in refusing to communicate intelligibly about art, becomes the ever more tireless, tiresome producer of: bizarre glamorisations of an aesthetic tradition that has come into almost entirely new relations to the society it used to be so central to.  

The deeper reason why Mr Craven can't write starts to become clear: because the great - and admirable - high-mindedness he wants to bring to the role of the arts writer becomes ridiculous when it comes into combination with the Arts Industry as it exists in the present day and age, with its anti-critical and an-aesthetic imperatives: maintaining an artistic star-system, depositing small references to the arts in as many places as possible, bringing the occasional controversy to the boil and artificially maintaining that aura of sublimity we all know art loses when it is rigorously subjected to the logic of sales-volumes and bums-on-seats.

Question: What happens when the imperative to glamourize the artistic product becomes the practical-social driver of your activity as a writer about art? Well, unless you drop the pretence of great critical grandeur, then at the very least the strain starts to show: above all, your language goes on an extended holiday - a round-the-world cruise maybe, on which adverbs go fly kites of their own, assonance runs riot, half of what you say sounds like it comes from a tourist brochure or a real estate catalogue and everything smells heavily of alcohol and sex:

"The novel pulsates with the portent and momentum of revelations Tranter either foreshadows to the point of obviousness or keeps putting further and more far-fetchedly [sic] out of reach. This makes the book's endless foreplay between its thriller elements and its loftily conceived moral dramas and soaring [sic] realism a little bit of a tease. But The Legacy retains a lot of magic along with its roughness. Full of suave and stunning [sic] evocations of Sydney and Manhattan, this sparkling and spacious [sic] novel captures the smell and sap [sic] of young people half in love with everyone they're vividly aware of, and groping to find themselves [sic] like the answer to an erotic enigma." (Peter Craven reviews Kirsten Tranter, The Monthly)

Oh dear. Let's hope there's an editor out there who still has the courage to call this stray ship back to port. The captain's drunk and is doing weird stuff on the bridge. The whole thing's totally sic!

Tuesday, August 31, 2010

G Flaubert: On Art and Being Ropeable

My sort of observation is mainly moral. I would never have suspected that side of [the existence of a traveler]. The psychological, human, comic side is so plentiful. You come across splendid faces, iridescent existences that glisten and gleam, exceedingly various in their rags and their robes, rich in filth, in their tatters and their finery. And there beneath it all, the old immutable, perennial rascality. That is the simple fact of the matter. What quantities of it pass before one's eyes! Now and again, in one of the towns, I open a newspaper. We seem to be going at a rattling pace. It's not a volcano we're dancing on, it's the plank over a latrine and it looks pretty precarious to me. Before too long, society is going to drown itself in the shit of nineteen centuries, and there will surely be some loud squawking.

To avoid the commonplace you lapse into bombast and, on the other hand, simplicity is so close to the merely platitudinous.

What a splendid Ernest! There he is married, established and perpetually magistrate besides. Behold, a bourgeois and a gentleman! Defender, now more than ever before, of order, propriety and the family. He has nevertheless followed the normal path. He too has been an artist, has carried a dagger and dreamed up ideas for plays. He's been a frivolous student in the Latin Quarter; he had a local shop-girl that he called "his mistress" and I used to scandalise her with my talk when I went to see him in his fetid rooms. He sampled the cancan at the Chaumiere and he drank spiced wine at the Voltaire. Then he got his doctorate. Henceforth began the comedy of being serious, as a sequel to the serious pursuit of the comic. 

Republic or monarch, we won't get beyond all that stuff for some time. It's the outcome of protracted endeavours in which all have played their part from de Maistre down to pere Enfantin. And the republicans have done more than most. What is equality then if it is not the negation of all liberty, all forms of superiority, of Nature itself. Equality, it's slavery. That is why I love art. There, at least, all is liberty in this world of fictions. - Every wish is granted, you can do anything, simultaneously be king and subject, active and passive, victim and priest. No limits there; for you and your kind humanity is a puppet with little bells on its costume to be set jingling with a prod of the pen, just like the street-corner puppeteer who works the strings with his foot.

In my opinion one of the things that proves that art is completely forgotten is the quantity of artists there are swarming about. The more choristers there are in a church, the more it may be supposed that the parishioners themselves are not real believers. They are not concerned about praying to the Good Lord, nor are they concerned about cultivating their gardens, as Candide puts it. They are more interested in having splendid vestments. Instead of towing the public along, you let it pull you. There is more pure bourgeoisdom among men of letters than there is in the grocery business. What are they actually doing, if not endeavouring by every possible device to diddle the customer, while still believing themselves honest! (artists in other words), all of which is the epitome of  bourgeoisdom

Everything feeds into Affectation: oneself, other people, sunlight, graveyards, and so on. . .

If I had a more solid brain I would certainly not have fallen ill from the vexation of doing law. Instead of taking hurt, I would have turned it to my advantage. My grief, instead of sitting in my skull, trickled down into my limbs and twisted them with convulsions. It was a deviation. You often find children who are injured by music. They have real talent, they remember tunes after hearing them once, they become over-excited when they play the piano; their hearts flutter, they lose weight, they go pale, they fall ill. And their poor nerves, like a dog's, are wrenched with pain at the sound of the notes. They are certainly not the Mozarts of the future. The  vocation has been displaced. The idea has slipped into the body and there it lies barren, and the body is wrecked in the process. Neither genius nor good health can come of it.
Same thing in art. Lines of poetry are not made from the passions. And the more personal you are, the weaker you will be. I have always transgressed in that way; because I have always put myself into everything that I have done. For instance, it was me who was in the place of Saint Antony [in F's first-written novel The Temptation of Saint Antony. CS] The temptation was mine rather than the reader's. 187

That is why I detest poetry that comes out in phrases. When it comes to things for which there are no words, the eye is enough. The exhalations of the soul, lyricism, descriptions, I want it all to be done with style. Otherwise it is a prostitution, of art, and even of feeling. . . They are all essentially the same, all the people who tell you about their lost love, their mother's grave, their father's grave, their sacred memories, who kiss medallions, who weep in the moonlight, who go into raptures when they see children, swoon at the theatre, look thoughtful when they stand by the Ocean. Fakers! fakers! triple charlatans! who use their hearts as trampolines in order to reach up to something.

I am turning towards a kind of aesthetic mysticism (if those two words can go together), and I would wish it stronger. When you receive no encouragement from other people, when the outside world disgusts you, enfeebles you, corrupts you and wears you down, then decent and sensitive people are forced to seek somewhere within themselves a more suitable place to live. If society carries on the way it is going, I do believe that we shall see a revival of mysticism, as has happened in every gloomy era. Unable to find any outlet, the human spirit will be condensed. Perhaps the day is not far away when we shall witness the return of a universal apathy, of beliefs in the end of the world, of a new Messiah. But because the theological foundations are missing, where will this oblivious enthusiasm find its field of action? Some will seek it out in sex, some in the old religions, some in art; and the human race, like the jews wandering in the desert will chase after all kinds of idols. We have come upon the scene a little too early. In another twenty-five years the point of intersection will be superb. In the hands of a master, when that day comes, prose will be able to play a formidable humanitarian symphony. Books like the Satyricon and The Golden Ass could come back again, transposing into psychic excess everything that such books offered by way of carnal excess. 

When the brain droops, the cock stands up.

The best authors believe that they write tolerably well. (La Bruyere)

I do know that it is impossible to get published anywhere, at the moment, and that all the actual reviews are squalid whores playing the coquette. Pox-ridden to the very marrow, they pull a face at opening their legs to the healthy creations that are desperate to get in. So, the best way is to do what you do, publish in book form, it's more daring, and be on your own. F to Louise Colet, March 1853

We used to have a poor devil of a servant, a man who now drives a hackney-coach; this wretched Louis had - or thought he had - a tapeworm. He talks about it as if it were a real person who talks to him and tells him what it wants, and he always refers to this creature inside him as he. Sometimes he has cravings and he attributes them to the tapeworm: "He wants it," and Louis immediately obliges. Recently he wanted thirty sous worth of brioche; another time he had to have some white wine, and next day he would kick up a fuss if he were given red wine. This poor man eventually sank in his own estimation to the same level as the tapeworm; they are equals and they are locked in a dreadful battle. "Madame," (he said to my sister-in-law recently), that scoundrel has got it in for me; we are daggers drawn, you see; but I shall have my revenge. One of us will be left standing." Well it's the man who will be left standing or should I say the man who will step aside for the tapeworm. So as to kill it and get rid of it, he has recently swallowed a bottle of vitriol, and he is now dying as a result. I am not sure if you appreciate the profundity of this story. Can you see this man finally believing in the almost human existence of what was perhaps only an idea, becoming the slave of his tapeworm! I find it quite dizzying. What a strange thing is the human mind!

I think that the sufferings of the modern artist, by comparison with artists of former times, are like factories compared to craft production.

The political situation has confirmed my old a priori theories about the featherless biped, whom I regard as a cross between a turkey and a vulture.

Perhaps I would've been a great writer if language had not been so unmanageable. (Goethe)

If the moral sciences had two or three primordial laws at their disposal, as in mathematics, then they would make real progress. But they are groping in the shadows, bumping into things at random and wanting to establish them as axiomatic. This word, soul, has spawned almost as many stupid remarks as there are souls!

People write books for everyone, art for everyone, science for everyone, just as they build railways and soup-kitchens. The human race has a passion for moral degradation. And I am angry at having to be part of it.

One thing is for sure, I am part monk. I have always greatly admired those fine sturdy fellows who lead solitary lives, whether dedicated to drunkenness or mysticism. It was really one in the eye for the human race, for the useful, for general well-being.

exposition . . . the purest poetry. . . 

If you want to know my frank and confidential opinion, I have not written anything which I find fully satisfactory. There is in me, very distinctly I believe, an ideal (apologies for that word), an ideal of style, the pursuit of which leaves me gasping without respite. Despair is consequently my normal state of mind. It takes a violent distraction to fetch me out of it. And anyway, I am not naturally cheerful. Gross buffoonery and obscenity in unlimited quantities, but underneath it all is my lugubriousness. In short, life pisses me off considerably and that is the declaration of my faith.

Reread and rework your story. Leave it alone and then take it up again, because books are not sired like children, they are raised like pyramids, according to a premeditated plan, by transporting great blocks and piling them up one on top of the other, a back-breaking grinding toil. And it's totally useless! And it sits in the desert casting a prodigious shadow! The jackals piss all round it and the bourgeois come and clamber over it, and so on; extend the analogy. F to E Feydeau, October 1857

What is the best guise in which to give voice occasionally to one's opinion concerning the events of this world, without having to risk looking like an imbecile later on? This is a rather serious problem. I think the best thing is to portray, in all sincerity, the things you find exasperating. Dissection is a form of revenge.

Those who have no need for the supernatural are rare indeed. Philosophy will always be exclusively the portion of aristocrats. You can fatten up the human throng, bed them up to their bellies in straw and even cover their stables in gold leaf, brutish they will always be, whatever anyone says. The only progress we can hope for is that the brute can be made a little less spiteful.

Lucretius ought to be mentioned with some respect. I see nobody to match him except for Byron, and Byron doesn't have his gravitas, or the sincerity of his sadness. I think the melancholy of the Ancients runs deeper than that of the Moderns, who all more or less hint at immortality beyond the black hole. But for the Ancients that black hole was infinity itself; their dreams dawn and fade against a background of ebony darkness. No cries, no convulsions, nothing but a face fixed in thought. From Cicero to Marcus Aurelius, when the gods had gone and Christ had not yet come, there was a unique moment when only man existed. Nowhere else do I find such grandeur.

I am suspicious of your novel about the theatre. You are too fond of them, those people! Have you met many who love their art? So many artists are merely bourgeois who have strayed from the path. F to George Sand, September 1868

In the days of Pericles the Greeks produced works of art without knowing whether they would have enough to eat on the morrow. Let us be like the Greeks!

Paganism, Christianity and now the Age of the Lout: these are the three great phases of human history. It is unpleasant to find oneself at the beginning of the third.

The downfall of the bourgeoisie has begun, because it shares the feelings of the rabble. I cannot see that it reads different newspapers, that it enjoys different music, that its pleasures are any more dignified. In both cases, there is the same love of money, the same reverence for the fait accompli, the same need for idols to overturn, the same hatred of anything superior, the same spirit of denigration, the same crass ignorance!

Because of your contempt for intelligence, you think yourselves full of common sense, realistic, practical! But people are only truly practical on the condition that they are a little more than that. . . You would not be enjoying all the benefits of industry if the only ideal of your eighteenth century ancestors had been material usefulness.F to the Municipal Council of Rouen, 1872

I am not a Nature man: I find it's "marvels" less moving than those of Art. It overwhelms me without imparting any "great ideas". I am inclined to tell it inwardly: "that's lovely; I emerged from you quite recently; in a few minutes I shall be back inside you; just leave me in peace. I have better things to do."

From: Flaubert, Selected Letters

Friday, August 27, 2010

Pseuds Corner Black Label Edition: Damon Young

Just as the pink petals fling themselves onto asphalt and pebbled concrete, so too does Nikos throw Why into the day. His why is not simply an interrogation - in the face of daffodils, baby honey-eaters and blossoms, it is a celebration, a yes to what perplexes and goads with its tangible thusness. (Damon Young, "My Melbourne Spring", Meanjin Volume 69, No. 3, 2010)

Distraction draws on the lives and ideas of a surprising and illuminating collection of philosophers, writers and artists – from Plato to Matisse, from Seneca to Machiavelli, from Nietzsche to T.S. Eliot. ‘They are not heroes,’ says Young, ‘they are my peers. They are people who I talk to like to my friends. What I do with their advice is my business but I will certainly ask for it. In writing this book I have wanted to meet them. I have wanted to say to Seneca, “Dear Seneca, your death is an inspiration!”. I wanted to say to Ovid, “your poems have survived!” I wanted to say to all of them, “All this time later, we remember you!”’ (Maria Tumarkin interviews Damon Young)

To avoid the commonplace you lapse into bombast and, on the other hand, simplicity is so close to the merely platiduninous. - Flaubert

***

What do you do as an aspiring writer with those stray thoughts that you're really rather brilliant – that ecstatic inkling that the greatest writers of all times are not so much your heroes but your . . . peers and equals? What do you do if you're an aspiring philosopher with the afternoon dream that the content of your life - your kids, your happy relationships, your love of old pens and karate - is deeply admirable? The Great Stage's advice is - if you ever get round to putting them down on paper - stow them away in a folder in the bottom drawer of your desk, lock that drawer and get someone you trust to mind the key. The writer who features as the star of our second Deluxe Edition of Pseuds Corner has earned a proud place for himself there by doing the opposite - letting the notion that the small details of his own life are really rather edifying colour his writing: indeed a lot of the time not just colour it, but supply its basic content.

Damon Young's self-appointed task as a philosopher is to offer general advice to the perplexed. And there's nothing wrong with that in itself. However, the fact that so much of the good counsel comes with reference to the exemplary sophistication - the raw satisfactoriness - of Mr Young himself is a major problem. Three years after the publication of his first book, Distraction: A Philosopher's Guide to Being Free, Young is already talking about it as if it were the work of late Emerson, warmly effusing on the ABC website about the air of "meditative patience” he detects in certain passages of the book he wrote with his favourite fountain pen:

'My pen,' wrote the Roman author Ovid, 'the best part of me, truest witness, my soul's true mirror.' Of course, Ovid was exiled to the shores of the Black Sea because of his quill. But never mind, the lonely poet was right: our pens can help to bring out what's best in us. It's easy to forget this. We see so many pens: countless chewed, inky, snapped biros. In 2005, Bic apparently sold it's one-hundred-billionth pen. With these figures, it's easy to take them for granted, leave them between car seats, or use them as pea-shooters. (Am I giving away too much about my teenage years?)
But why? In a time of cheap ballpoints, tiny laptops and Word-enabled mobile phones, what on earth can be gained from a fountain pen? Isn't this just expensive, shallow, Luddite stubbornness? Perhaps for some, it's a misplaced longing for the past, or a sign of pomposity. But for most, it's simply a useful, beautiful, evocative tool. . . Take my new pen, a simple European model. It is simply a pleasure to use: balance, texture, colour, line - these all add to the experience of writing. And as I write a lot, this is important. It makes the job a joy. . . By encouraging longhand, it offers meditation, focus, personality. I wrote much of Distraction by hand, and the passages written in longhand have a certain meditative patience. (Damon Young, “The Write Tools” darkly wise, rudely great; “Write On” ABC Online, The Drum Unleashed: Robust Community Debate)
 
Major problem number 2 is that he insists on calling the product of this rather tepid narcissistic discourse of the self “philosophy”. Too often Young strays into territory that is philosophy-related but distinctly unphilosophical. Distraction and many of Young's various efforts on the opinion pages of newspapers degenerate into a sort of literary-philosophical Who Weekly, throwing round the names of the odd philosophical classic, or milking episodes from the lives of the philosophical greats for home-truths that are instantly applicable to the busy inhabitants of the contemporary world.

This is not to deny the need for philosophy to keep in touch with what the Germans call Lebensweisheit; the practical wisdom of the world is a neglected aspect of philosophy's historic role, so much so that practical wisdom is sometimes seen as a challenge to philosophy coming from outside philosophy, rather than one of philosophy's perennial sources. (On this equally cockeyed view, Lebensweisheit is a sort of instinctive protest leveled by non-philosophers against philosophers' ingrained habit of turning just about everything into an open-ended series of potentially quite complicated questions.) How philosophy in its incarnation as Lebensweisheit came to be neglected is a question that's been posed on The Great Stage once or twice before. The fact that practical philosophical wisdom has fallen into disuse seems to stem at least partly from the way philosophy is nowadays expected to justify itself to the institutional powers-that-be within universities as a distinct discipline with a technical vocabulary, science-like research methods, cognitive authorities, disciplinary boundaries and a specifiable use-value of its own. Within the contemporary academy, philosophy, it has to be said, turns easily into a rather desperate exercise in academic conformity on the part of what was historically a sort of anti-discipline - one, indeed, that has produced some of the most chequered non-conformists of all history. Part of the academic mug’s game that philosophers are forced to play involves seeking out industry partnerships and justifying the tangible benefits of philosophical scholarship to the economic life of the nation in pretty much the same terms that the engineering faculty points up its contribution to more efficient power grids and the medical faculty its presence on the advancing front of breast cancer research. You don’t have to be a great sage to see that the playing field isn’t quite level.

Young's major intellectual problem is not academic philosophical conformity, however, but the opposite - the conformism of the book market, with its many varieties of half-written fiction and half-thought thought - so few of which seem like the result of aesthetic conception or philosophical reflection pursued for their own sake. While philosophy as a technical speciality passes over into a would-be science that is equally devoid of depth and the rush and colour of life, philosophy as Lebensweisheit passes over into lifestyle journalism, finding would-be depth anywhere and everywhere. Philosophy as lifestyle journalism dive-bombs into the shallows, mistaking the clarity with which it sees the bottom for penetration of vision. In a nutshell - the problem here is that philosophy, as it's practised by Young and his pop philosophical models, especially when it takes up residence in the arts liftouts of newspapers and so cuts its ideas down to the size required by the liftout format and the liftout tone, loses connection with the other bases of the overall philosophical enterprise. Philosophy without Lebensweisheit is often colourless, pointlessly theory-driven; on the other hand, philosophy which develops no rigorous concepts, builds no theories and puts no intellectually concentrated images into circulation is humdrum - humdrum, and, in Young's case, liable to inflate its own credentials with grandiose fantasies about its own significance.

At the heart of the problem is the conversion of what were once known as literature and philosophy into a literature and philosophy industry. Though you can sometimes hear the pain and self-doubt with which “industry representatives” use this crassly inappropriate metaphor, so many of them just keep on doing it. The situation is one to which Young is no doubt doing his best to adapt. The re-invention of literature and philosophy as industries means exactly what you’d expect it to mean: rapid machine-like production of standardized opinions and works for as wide an audience – or as well-defined a niche market – as possible. Above all, it means systematically and tirelessly exercising your powers of self-promotion. On Young’s blog, “darkly wise, rudely great”, the sad joke that human communication on the whole is degenerating under the conditions set by the contemporary market economy into one vastly ramifying exercise in cross-promotion seems to come true literally. And in general, so much of what is happening in the public world of writing reads like a textbook case from a first-year macroeconomics seminar: the ever more extravagant self-praise in the literary “industry” looks like a bad case of runaway inflation, where the expectation that everyone else in the market is about to jack up their prices or their stated opinion of themselves leads every individual market player to make the expectation come true, precisely because it seems the only way of holding your own. Of course, it has to be said emphatically – pretty much everyone is doing it in the book industry, though no one is doing it quite like Young. It’s so often what makes the internet – the blogosphere especially – so tedious. Time and again, your heart rises as you come across a bright independent new voice. Time and again, what you find you’ve discovered is another “emerging writer” rotating on the spot within a narrow circle of egotistical career-building self-preoccupation.

Some of the lifestyle philosophy on the market - not only Young's - comes pretty close to Oprah-style pop-psychological fluff. In fact, it often comes to something worse than that. Oprah doesn't purport to be much more than a saleswoman of "the happy thing"; her attitude seems basically to be that whatever puts you in the happy way should be given a go, whether it's white-water rafting, standing on your head, joining Rotary, salsa aerobics, having a good cry on tv (or a good scream) or saying to yourself that you're worth it 30 times a day. Young, on the other hand, dignifies his more high-minded mix of happy-making activities with the name of an ancient and venerable subject, philosophy. In doing so he flatters the vanity of his uncritical readers that their everyday concerns are quintessentially philosophical. Of course they aren’t “unphilosophical”. But to pretend that they’re anything but potential starting points for a type of reflection that is arduous, analytic, scholarly, argumentative and many other things besides – is to seriously gild the lily.

Young’s personal specialty - distilling moral commonplaces from his own life and the lives of philosophical and literary greats - needs to be viewed with a wide cultural lens. What it seems to be part of, in the long-run, is a pop cultural reduction of the past, above all the extraordinary cultural creativity of historical individuals, to a routine set of comestible, rather sentimental concerns. This is the same general process whereby Keats becomes a pseudo-American heart-throb, every second Jane Austen character turns into an Eastern Suburbs private schoolgirl and John Nash goes from being a profoundly dissociative mathematical mind to a "beautiful mind" whose owner is cured of his non-conformity by the Power of Love and Success. In Young’s work, the whole process of anti-metamorphosis – the transmutation of the extraordinary and the complex into the simple and approachable - goes even more badly wrong. Plato turns into someone who belongs simultaneously in a glossy travel brochure ("The evening breeze from Piraeus was perfect") and in second-rate gay pornography ("He was young, handsome, well built - he could feel the eyes of the old men on him, touching him, tasting him.") Marx turns into a man who liked his seafood and whose life-work confronts us with the unchallenging idea that "in the economy, as in the jungle, there's no such thing as a free lunch". What can you say? Praise the thinker and pass the canape's! But don’t talk to me about philosophy.

 ***

Home is a varied thing: part sanctuary, part nursery, part kitchen and vegetable garden, part office. If I were to give a word to what unites it all, I wouldn't say bricks and mortgage. I'd say 'rhythm'.- Home combines all sorts of rhythms: eating and sleeping, outings and returns, work and play, and the cadence within each. For example, the rhythm of chopping parsnip and carrot for mackerel soup is very different to the rhythm of writing a newspaper column. Yet home throbs with all of this. (Germaine Leece interviews Damon Young about "The Philosophy of Home", Some Home Truths - What Home Means To Us Today)

Put economically, attention is a scarce and precious resource; frustrating as this might be, we have to be canny with it. When we cannot do this, we're said to be "distracted". The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that to distract someone is to "prevent (someone) from giving their full attention to something". For example, while I was writing this book my wife, Ruth, read the first two paragraphs and immediately wanted to talk about our little boy. In the words of the Oxford English Dictionary, she was "preventing her husband from giving his full attention to his book". With her understandable interest in our son, she was distracting me: presenting a stimulus that clogged up my perceptual bottleneck. - But there's more to distraction than a breach of cognitive constraints. Psychological blockages are part of a much larger set of limitations: those of mortal life itself. (Damon Young, Distraction: A Philosopher's Guide to Being Free)

"It can be genuinely consoling to admit that we all struggle to seize life's elusive potential. With a combination of Schadenfreude and relief, I certainly feel much better when I read of Marx's chaotic work habits. He apparently found all his domestic arrangements difficult, and spoke of producing "miniature dunghills" after his daughter Eleanor was born. When he did get the time to work on what he once called his "economic shit", he would embroil himself in petty disputes, even challenging mortified writers and editors to duels. (And I thought my hours spent watching Doctor Who were wasteful!) . . . Marx was a curious mix of idler and workaholic. He was often distracted from his important work by petty disputes, domestic chaos and illness. If the portly, scruffy philosopher wasn't fidgeting or pacing, his fiery temperament led him astray. And when A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy didn't live up to Marx's hype, his easily diverted character was to blame: despite all his self-congratulation, he simply hadn't put the work in. Admittedly, it's hard to concentrate on the revolution when your arse boils are flaring up. Yet Marx's chaotic home, unpaid bills and life of impetuous feuds give the impression of a disorganised teenager in a man's shaggy body. . . We need to eat, to wash, to find shelter, and these things aren't provided gratis by Mother Earth. As Marx was keen to point out however, most work is simply the replacement of one necessity with another: the laws of the economy become as commonsensical as those of metabolism and circulation. Even if we don't catch our own fish (Marx's favourite dish), we still have to pay the bills (or, in Marx's case, get Engels to pay them). The lesson is simple: even if you're bankrolled by the son of a wealthy industrialist, necessity will out. In the economy, as in the jungle, there's often no such thing as a free lunch. (Damon Young, Distraction: A Philosopher's Guide to Being Free)

Aristodemus [i.e. Plato] shrugged his broad shoulders. He was young, handsome, well built - he could feel the eyes of the old men on him, touching him, tasting him. He enjoyed the attention, the longing of their wrinkled hands, dried-up mouths. But they were disgusting. He looked around him, quietly grimacing at the landmarks and faces. Luminescent above him was the old Parthenon. How typical of this race of old women - a temple to a virginal, celibate sky-gazer. Still, she did help that cunning old bastard, Odysseus. She wasn't all bad. . . He ran his fingers over his chest. His biceps swelled, forearms tensed - and more looks of longing. Plato revelled in this distance, in the human span that cut him from his admirers. Being beautiful was easy enough - there were plenty of handsome young epheboi. His exquisiteness was his discipline: he knew with precision how to approach and withdraw, how to mix tenderness with cruelty. - He drummed his fingers on his thigh, watching the muscles dance. Hypnotised, he turned as he heard footsteps behind him - but he kept up the cadence on his skin. It was his brother. "Plato, you little oik. Father wants you." . . . (Damon Young, "The Lesson", Meanjin)

Socrates laughed. It was a hoarse, wet-sounding laugh - but a genuine one.
"I know I'm wonderfully amusing," said Plato. "Lucky you - I'm to be your pet boy, yes?"
"Absolutely," said Socrates dryly. "Once you're spayed and toilet trained you'll be perfect."
"Don't blaspheme," was the quick reply. "Only the gods are perfect. And Pericles, of course - if you believe my uncle."
Socrates laughed softly and rose. Without a word, he unfastened his tunic, kicked off his sandals, and waved for a slave with oil. "Enough. It's time for you to teach me a lesson [in the wrestling ring]."
"You're joking," said Plato, looking the old man up and down. For an ugly mutt, he had a beautiful physique - muscular, well-proportioned, relaxed. He looked like a nobleman, except for his horrid mien.
"Why does everyone," laughed Socrates, "say that when I'm naked? No, I'm serious. You're not afraid of a little wrestling, are you? What a shame, Plato. I think your uncle's Persian perfumes have made you into a sissy."
Plato shook his head and stripped. The slave oiled Socrates first, and then the younger man. They stepped into the arena. As they stretched, Plato enjoyed the soft sand, still warm on his feet. The evening breeze from Piraeus was perfect. (Damon Young, "The Lesson", Meanjin)

Aren't children a distraction from creative endeavour? In a word, no. I think Connolly, and those who agree with him today, are profoundly mistaken about the role of children in creative life. And their failure to appreciate this stems from a confusion about the nature of distraction itself. . . For example, as the parent of a verbose, energetic little toddler, I'm more productive than when I was single. The reason for this is simple: I've learned to work with less! Dealing for months on end with sporadic working hours and flagging energy, I became accustomed to opportunistic work: getting pen to paper, whenever or wherever I had the opportunity. He's asleep in a cafe? Great, time to finish off that chapter! He's absored in his Lego? Brilliant, I can catch up on important emails! Put simply, parenthood has disciplined me - and maybe Cyril Connolly was just a little, well, soft.
. . . Playing with Nikos has been a great exercise in creativity. Whether it's morning Lego, drawing differs or making a chair-and-doona cubby, playtime accustoms me to open-ended, free-thinking activity. It urges me to be cautious, less conservative in my writing and thinking; to commit myself to the twists and turns of the process, rather than desperately chasing outcomes. It becomes less rigid, and more innovative. . . But most importantly, my son is a commitment; a living line in the sand. This might sound glib, but he's often why  Iwrite. To take up my pen with sincerity is to defend him, and the sort of world I'd like for him. In this, he a reminder of what I value inlife, and the embodiment of every living thing. If I want a more creative existence, he's not a distraction - on the contrary, he's what I should never be distracted from. (And, bless him, he hasn't woken up yet!) (Damon Young, "Driven by distraction" The Age)

[pen-portrait of Mr Young by A Karenina]

Sunday, August 1, 2010

Pseuds Corner - Part 8

As the University strives for excellence in research outcomes it is actively seeking to accelerate its engagement with the world and harness resources and expertise from several continents. Monash focuses its world-wide engagement through strategic and long-term partnerships. - In an increasingly transforming and competitive environment we need new ways of thinking about international engagement and what it means to be a ‘truly international university’. There are three important elements that form the core of international research and international education: mobility, collaboration and contribution. Mobility, is argued to be about [sic] creating opportunities for students and staff to travel beyond their borders in an attempt to nurture ‘global citizens with global outlook’. Collaboration is about forging new partnerships based on collaboration [sic] and mutual respect that produces ‘win-win’ outcomes to ensure that relationships going forward are sustainable. And contribution is not only about equipping our future generation of leaders with the relevant skills and values to contribute to society but universities leading by example in providing educational opportunities beyond monetary gains. (Professor Stephanie Fahey, Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Global Engagment) "Message from the DVC(GE)", Monash University)

Home is a varied thing: part sanctuary, part nursery, part kitchen and vegetable garden, part office. If I were to give a word to what unites it all, I wouldn't say bricks and mortgage. I'd say 'rhythm'.- Home combines all sorts of rhythms: eating and sleeping, outings and returns, work and play, and the cadence within each. For example, the rhythm of chopping parsnip and carrot for mackerel soup is very different to the rhythm of writing a newspaper column. Yet home throbs with all of this. (Germaine Leece interviews Damon Young about "The Philosophy of Home", Some Home Truths - What Home Means To Us Today)

Finally, the means of measuring and evaluating knowledge transfer needs to be agreed. There are models and frameworks for evaluating the work of a department or unit in this area. For evaluating staff performance, the standard at present is likely to be Michigan State University’s Evaluating Quality Outreach Framework. Here, a staff project is measured against four dimensions: significance, context, scholarship and impact, and for each of these an appropriate group of qualitative and quantitative measures is chosen from a menu. Evaluation usually involves comparing historical data of external and internal outputs, and relating the department’s priorities to the percentage of staff time and cost. A staff member makes a portfolio submission, which includes a list of projects and clarification of their percentage contribution to each; the staff member’s reflective narrative of their own output; external documentation of impacts such as satisfaction surveys, testimonials and external reviews; and numerical data such as the number of students involved in an activity, the number of product units distributed and the number of community members involved. The Michigan State framework provides a rich array of alternatives to traditional measures of research or teaching performance, which are generally not appropriate for knowledge transfer. (Professor Warren Bebbington, Deputy Vice-Chancellor ("University Affairs"), "Embedding knowledge transfer in the university agenda")

The Proposition seemed to me like the kind of arthouse schlock that rides into battle with severed heads and genitals held on high as emblems of a ghastliness that can outstare realism, a cocaine-like fantasy of epic grandeur that sizzles and fizzles with a sort of adolescent poetry but lacks anything that might give it form or pressure. . .
From the outset [John Hillcoat's new film, The Road] skilfully establishes the moral gravity that underlines the horror-style narrative momentum. The father's narration tells us that if God's voice does not come through the child, then he never spoke a word. And so it goes as father and son move over the bleached and devatstated landscapes of some rural Pennsylvania or Oregon of the mind, some Montana that may be coterminous with a world where men rove like wolves. (Peter Craven on filming Cormac McCarthy's The Road, Australian Review of Books)

The essence of place-making is community engagement. It is more than just community consultation: it is genuine engagement and connectedness with individual community members - to a point where they themselves become place-makers of their own making. - Beautiful and meaningful places and spaces create an intransient value to the locality and a sense of pride to the community. As a result, people spend more time in their community: walking more, buying locally and spending more leisure and play time locally in vibrant mainstreets where there are places to sit, pause, learn, shop, connect and celebrate. - We all know and gravitate towards such places, and yet we keep building ‘empty’ places with little or no sense of ‘spirit of place’. Some would blame globalisation and consumerism on the demise of local communities, where they are reduced to their lowest common denominator - commercial exchange. Some would say that our built environment professionals are too focused on the hardware of place and have neglected the software, the soft skill of place-making. - Place-making provides a way of seeing the world through a more sustainable filter, and provides a platform to make the necessary changes and move towards sustainable lifestyles and behaviours. ("The art of place-making" Urban Design Forum)

One of the challenges for those who like to achieve is reconciling success and happiness. Most contemporary success formulas, science or systems have an element of drive or doing. Most of the happiness schools of thought talk about being present and living in the moment and being. - This creates a clash...or does it? - It's not an either/or proposition, it's an and/also one. It's about walking and chewing gum. Set the goals and intent but then let go and enjoy the process you put in place. The key idea to mesh these two worlds is to study or consider manifestation as an idea. It's about intent and action. Or put another way, you can pray as much as you like but you have to move your feet as well. (Matt Church, "Consider manifestation", Inspiring ThoughtLeadership)


What is Gender-Based Analysis (GBA)? GBA is a tool to assist in systematically integrating gender considerations into the policy, planning and decision-making processes. It corresponds to a broader understanding of gender equality using various competencies and skills to involve both women and men in building society and preparing for the future.
What is gender mainstreaming? Gender mainstreaming is a dual approach that implies the reorganisation, improvement, development and evaluation of all policy processes for the purpose of incorporating a gender equality perspective into all policies, at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making. By bringing gender equality issues into the mainstream, mainstreaming them, we can make sure that the gender component is considered in the widest possible variety of sectors, such as work, taxation, transport and immigration.
Who does GBA? Individuals who participate in developing policies, programs and projects are doing GBA. Including gender expertise in the policy process helps policy-makers become more gender-aware and encourages them to incorporate that awareness into their work. Most often, people who do GBA are:
- Involved in the planning and design of governmental or non-governmental interventions.
- Involved in the administration or implementation of governmental or non-governmental interventions.
- Participating in governmental or non-governmental interventions.
- Involved in developing policy or in research that guides governmental or non-governmental interventions.
[continues at length. . .] ("What is Gender-Based Analysis? (GBA)")

Spotters: CMcC, LK, CS

Friday, July 30, 2010

Harry Redner: Failings in the Social Sciences and Humanities

From H. Redner The Ends of Science, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987 - Chapter 6, "Pathologies of Science"

Philosophy is strictly speaking neither a science nor a humanity. It is an august subject of great antiquity, one that has only since the nineteenth century been professionalised in an academic setting. Such an abstruse and other-worldly subject might be expected to be little affected by the pressures of academic politics. In fact, the very opposite has proved to be the case, for precisely because philosophy is not bound by scientific criteria of utility or by humanistic ones of cultural interest and relevance, it has become all the more readily subject to the determinants of disciplinary authority. Since philosophy is relatively unconstrained by any need to be accountable to other interests and is free to pursue whatever aims it sets for itself in its departmental fastness as a minor academic backwater, it has in fact lent itself all the more easily to the free play of internal academic politics. Thus, Richard Rorty, a prominent philosopher and critic of philosophy, who because of his criticisms is being treated [c. 1988] as something of an outcast, explains that the subject matter of philosophy has largely been determined by the outcome of political struggles within the discipline: "the topics and authors which fall under the care of philosophy departments form a largely accidental and quite temporary hodgepodge - determined mostly by the accidents of power struggles within universities and by current fashions" (Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 30). In his account of current academic philosophy Rorty stresses the struggles between the reigning paradigm of the discipline in Anglo-Saxon universities, analytic philosophy, and the other brands challenging its dominance, collectively called continental philosophy. The history of contemporary philosophy is largely "a story of academic politics. . . one of struggles between kinds of professors" (ibid, p. 228). Rorty tends to be rather nonchalant about this because he believes that "problems created by academic politics can be solved by more academic politics" (ibid). But, as we shall see, it is not easy to reform a disciplinary paradigm, no matter how empty it has become, or to introduce another elsewhere in the university system, since the struggle for academic survival ensures that only one subject-species can fill the available academic niche.

Elsewhere in his work Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 132 - 36) explains how philosophy became a Fach (academic subject) or professionalised discipline, beginning with neo-Kantianism in the nineteenth century German university. The process was completed after WW2 in the American university system where philosophy acquired a professional organisation with journals, a peer review system, grants, PhD training and all the other paraphenalia of the sciences. The earlier preponderance of patronal authority - which is still more or less the norm on the continent - gave way within the Anglo-Saxon system to formal-professional authority with a strong collegial elite of elderly eminences grises. [NB Previous chapters of The Ends of Science have given a detailed typology of disciplinary authority, the patronal and formal-professional types being two among many. CS] This authority rules with a very strong hand, excluding and outlawing any philosophic perspective other than that which falls within the analytic spectrum. Occasional open rebellions against this draconian rule attest to this fact. Thus at the 76th annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association in New York in December 1979, a group of rebels, among them such prominent figures as William Barret and John Smith, "charged that the APA has become a monolith and intolerant, that its programmes neglected philosophic issues and that its leadership has lost contact with other philosophers". The academic political reasons for the dominance of analytic philosophy are openly acknowledged, and the upshot was "that the APA was dominated by people espousing analytic philosophy, preventing those with other perspectives from having an effective say in the organisation." As John Lachs puts it, in philosophy "power is an important and lucrative matter". "It was made clear that differences between the European Continental, historical position and the Anglo-Saxon Analytic position were not merely an abstract matter but touched on such practical matters as grants, government support, endowments, publishing and the placing of students and friends in faculty positions." It remains to be seen how this particular insurrection will fare, though one cannot be sanguine about one that seeks openly to assault an entrenched organisational position.

Perhaps because of previous failures at open reform, there have been many attempts to infiltrate continental philosophy into Anglo-American university by the backdoor of other departments. Thus the so-called "deconstructive" movement in literary criticism is partly such an attempt to smuggle in continental thought - mainly that of Derrida and his predecessors such as Heidegger and Nietzsche - through departments of comparative literature, English, French and German. This tactic has caused an inordinate amount of confusion and bitterness among the older style literary critics who cannot understand how and why their theories are being outflanked by something that claims to be more sophisticated than mere criticism but which they see as less interested in literature than in literary philosophy. [one might add older style anthropologists, classicists, historians, political theorists and numerous others. CS]. The battle lines are being drawn, with the opposed literary camps organising in cliques and possibly to become rival professional bodies. [One sees a whole front of the contemporary culture wars opening out from this point. Sickening stuff. CS] If the deconstructionists succeed in taking over some departments completely, two kinds of philosophy will be taught in Anglo-Saxon universities which have nothing to do with each other. This is already the situation at Sydney University in Australia. Rorty's (1982, p.328) rather blase' view that all this is "not much more, in the long run, than a matter of what sort of professors come under which departmental budget" seems mistaken, because once departmental divisions are set up there is no way of breaking through them and the discipline becomes fragmented, narrowed and impoverished.

Analytic philosophy and continental philosophy are already narrow, puristic subjects, the one stemming largely from the ideas of Wittgenstein and his predecessors Russell and Frege, the other from those of Heidegger and his predecessor Husserl. Both versions have by now become highly abstruse and almost empty of substantive content. Both shun involvement with the sciences, the arts or politics or with any other extra-mural thought. Practitioners of analytic philosophy have even gone as far as to show a disinterest in history, including the history of philosophy itself, so that they have almost lost touch with the metaphysical traditions of philosophy. The younger practitioners are little interested in the classics and are almost solely preoccupied with the latest issues of the journals, as set out by the prestigious figures of the field. The result, as Rorty sees it, has been as follows:

"Analytic philosophy was thus left without a genealogy, a sense of mission, or a meta-philosophy. Training in philosophy turned into a sort of "casebook" procedure, of the sort found in law schools. Students' wits were sharpened by reading pre-prints of articles by current fashionable figures, and finding objections to them. The students so trained began to think of themselves neither as continuing a tradition nor as participating in the solution of the "outstanding problems" at the frontiers of science. Rather, they took their self-image from a style and quality of argumentation. They became quasi-lawyers rather than quasi-scientists - hoping an interesting new case would turn up (Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 227)"

Like philosophy, politics is a subject of great antiquity which was transformed beyond recognition to become present political science. A brief sketch of this metamorphosis is offered by Habermas:

“In Aristotle’s opus the Politics is part of the practical philosophy. Its tradition reaches even into the nineteenth century, till it is finally broken off by the critique of Historicism. And its course dries up even more completely the more its currents are diverted into the channels of the specific sciences. Thus, since the end of the eighteenth century, the newly emerging social sciences and the disciplines of jurisprudence have drawn off the waters of classical politics. This process of separation from the body of practical philosophy has ended for the time with the establishment of political science on the model of the modern experimental sciences, having little more than the name in common with the old politics. Wherever we still encounter the latter, it seems hopelessly old fashioned to us.”

The discipline of politics has also experienced an insurrection against its current reduction to the “science of political behaviour”. As long ago as 1967 a Caucus for a New Political Science was founded to work within the instituted discipline appeared subsequently in a representative publication by members of this new caucus. Once again the main burden of the criticism is against the organized conformity of the discipline and its attempt to institute the behaviouralist paradigm as the sole intellectual content and method of politics. This disciplinary prescription was frequently buttressed by reference to Kuhn’s idea of a single paradigm per science. Peter Euben sums up this approach:

“A paradigm must be ‘enforced’. To achieve a science of politics, we need enforcers, we need those whose authority in a community of political scientists would function in ways comparable to that in the community of science. Tolerance for diversity within such a community, as within the “normal political science[‘ it would be there to defend, would necessarily be limited in order to guarantee cumulative knowledge.”

Euben predicts that such a paradigm community would soon cease to have much to do with real politics and become an ivory tower discipline: “the community of political science will be fairly small, embrace the concept of professionalism maintained by one or two core journals and the key textbooks, provide opportunities for closeness, common purpose etc.” This course, however, has not been followed since the pull of real politics is too strong to resist, especially by leading professors called to political office or advisory capacities. The converse danger is that the discipline will be staffed by ready apologists for the regime and its policies.

This evolution has been steadily taking place since the 1950’s, especially in American universities where politics is now frequently the study of what politicians are currently engaged in doing, mainly with the purpose of offering them acceptable academic advice and so making the scholars indispensable to the politicians – the example of Kissinger and Brzezinski looms large in the aspirations of political scientists. Long before he had assumed office, Brzezinski had already proffered such a programme for political studies:

“As engagement in the world is encouraging the appearance of a new breed of politicians-intellectuals, men who make it a point to mobilize and draw on the most expert, scientific, and academic advice in the development of political programmes . . . (so) the largely humanist-oriented, occasionally ideologically-minded intellectual-dissenter, who saw his role largely in terms of proffering social critiques, is rapidly being displaced either by experts and specialists, who become involved in special governmental undertakings, or by generalist-integrators, who become in effect house-ideologues for those in power, providing overall intellectual integration for disparate action.”

He has been as good as his word, both as academic and politician. Most other academic mandarins have followed suit. The result has been that foreign policy, diplomacy and international relations studied at present are mainly concerned with the balance of power in the period since the end of the war, with nuclear deterrence as a technical speciality and with the major power blocs as areas of specialization. The study of domestic policy, government and institutions has become focused on the current workings of corporatist representative democracy, concentrating on parties, pressure grops, administration, and the strategies and tactics of electioneering – the last even going to the ludicrous extreme of attempting to become established as a special science with the name of psephology. One-party systems are the preserve of specialists calling themselves Kremlinologists and China men. To this body of studies at the top of the status ladder are sometimes added bits and pieces derived from other sciences, such as political sociology or psychosocial politics, or the occasional subjects dealing with issues such as totalitarianism or Third World politics. An outline of the main modern ideologies is presented largely for undergraduate teaching purposes, though since the “end-of-ideology” thesis these are looked on more as historical curiosities. Only the ex-student radicals, with their influx of new Marxisms, have altered this development a little here and there. Political theory is frequently presented only for teaching purposes as a potted history of political philosophy. Political theorists have gone to the length of trying to establish a separate association called the Conference for the Study of Political Thought. But such secessions do not improve the discipline as a whole, which now suffers from an absence of integrating theories. There is usually nothing of what used to be considered the main staples of politics: no comprehensive theory of the State (Staatslehre), no theory of sovereignty, right or law, no ethical political philosophy or morality of power, no comprehensive theory of representation or power and authority, no utopian speculations, no comparative study of political systems in different countries and epochs, no political economy, no study of politics in relation to culture, no study of the “spirit” of politics, such as the classical concern with the civic virtue of citizens. In short, there is hardly anything left of what was thought worthy by classical political thinkers, as indeed Habermas declares.